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Riassunto
Il Gioco d’azzardo patologico (GAP) è una condizione cronica e progressiva, 
definita come “una condotta persistente e ricorrente di gioco maladattivo”; attualmente 
è incluso tra i Disturbi del controllo degli impulsi (non altrove classificati) nel 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders – Fourth Edition - Text Revision
(DSM-IV-TR). I criteri diagnostici per il GAP richiamano sia quelli tipici dei Disturbi 
da uso di sostanze (DUS) sia quelli che caratterizzano i disturbi compulsivi (in 
particolare, quelli del Disturbo ossessivo compulsivo [DOC]). 
I termini compulsività e impulsività vengono di norma utilizzati in maniera 
interscambiabile per definire le difficoltà nel controllo del comportamento che 
determinano la messa in atto di condotte psicopatologiche in maniera ripetuta e 
persistente; tuttavia, con essi si fa riferimento a due costrutti distinti. Per compulsività si 
intende la “tendenza a mettere in atto comportamenti ripetitivi in modo automatico o 
stereotipato, al fine di prevenire eventuali conseguenze negative, che determina 
compromissione del funzionamento”; d’altro canto, l’impulsività viene generalmente 
descritta come la “predisposizione a reagire a stimoli interni o esterni in maniera rapida 
e non pianificata, prestando scarsa considerazione a ciò che di negativo può derivare, 
per sé e per gli altri, dall’esecuzione di tali azioni”. 
Nella fenomenologia del GAP sono coinvolte caratteristiche sia compulsive che 
impulsive; vari autori hanno indagato tali aspetti avvalendosi primariamente di 
strumenti quali l’osservazione clinica e la somministrazione di questionari di 
autovalutazione. Sulla base della letteratura, il GAP può essere concettualizzato sia 
come un disturbo appartenente allo spettro compulsivo-impulsivo, sia come una 
dipendenza comportamentale. Entrambi questi quadri teorici sono stati presi in 
considerazione per la futura categorizzazione del GAP all’interno del DSM-5: 
comprendere quale sia il migliore è fondamentale da un punto di vista diagnostico. 
Sebbene i due approcci non siano mutualmente esclusivi, infatti, adottare l’uno piuttosto 
che l’altro ha importanti risvolti a livello clinico. 
Di recente si è riconosciuta la necessità di integrare indicatori di tipo sia 
fenotipico (i.e. fenomenologici) sia endofenotipico (i.e. comportamentali/fisiologici) nel 
corso dell’assessment psicodiagnostico. Gli endofenotipi sono delle misure del 
funzionamento neuropsicologico, neurofisiologico e biochimico dell’individuo; di 
conseguenza, anomalie riscontrabili a livello endofenotipico riflettono la presenza di 
una compromissione nei processi cognitivi sottostanti. E’ stato suggerito che la presenza 
di deficit in due funzioni esecutive mediate dalla corteccia prefrontale, quali l’abilità di 
inibizione della risposta motoria e l’abilità di presa di decisione, sia implicata nelle 
difficoltà di auto-regolazione comportamentale (i.e., comportamenti compulsivi e 
impulsivi) che caratterizzano particolari categorie di individui. Da questo punto di vista, 
i comportamenti di tipo compulsivo e impulsivo sarebbero da intendersi come: a. la 
conseguenza dell’emissione di una risposta precoce, messa in atto prima che uno 
specifico stimolo sia stato completamente processato, o il fallimento nell’inibizione di 
una risposta già iniziata; oppure b. la presenza di processi decisionali disfunzionali, che 
persistono indipendentemente dal fatto che le conseguenze del comportamento attuato 
siano negative o non ottimali. Per tale motivo, misure cognitive delle abilità di 
inibizione della risposta motoria e di presa di decisione potrebbero rappresentare 
promettenti indicatori endofenotipici della regolazione comportamentale; è stato infatti 
ipotizzato che le problematiche comportamentali manifestate da giocatori d’azzardo, 
pazienti con DOC e individui con DUS siano legate alla presenza di deficit in tali 
funzioni.
 La presente tesi di dottorato è stata realizzata sulla base di queste 
considerazioni, e alla luce del fatto che un confronto diretto tra giocatori d’azzardo, 
pazienti con DOC e individui con DUS possa rappresentare una via percorribile al fine 
di identificare la classificazione diagnostica più adatta per il GAP. 
Un gruppo di pazienti con GAP è stato messo a confronto con un gruppo di 
pazienti con DOC, un gruppo di dipendenti da alcol e uno di individui sani avvalendosi 
sia di questionari di autovalutazione che di prove cognitive atte a valutare compulsività 
e impulsività. Gli obiettivi principali erano l’indagine di somiglianze e differenze tra i 
tre gruppi clinici in tali dimensioni, e l’analisi degli di stili di risposta di ciascun gruppo 
alle prove cognitive. Per misurare l’abilità di inibizione della risposta motoria è stato 
impiegato un paradigma Go/Nogo, mentre per valutare i processi di presa di decisione si 
è utilizzato l’Iowa Gambling Task (IGT). 
Inoltre, i dati relativi a prove self-report e cognitive di un piccolo gruppo di 
giocatori d’azzardo sono stati confrontati con quelli ottenuti da un gruppo di croupier. Il 
gioco d’azzardo rappresenta l’attività principale per entrambe le categorie di individui; 
inoltre, è stato riscontrato che i croupier hanno un rischio di sviluppare condotte di 
gioco d’azzardo problematico o patologico maggiore rispetto a quello rilevato nella 
popolazione generale. Di conseguenza, esaminare caratteristiche di compulsività e 
impulsività in tale gruppo di individui può rivelarsi utile al fine di individuare i fattori 
potenzialmente coinvolti nello sviluppo del disturbo.
I risultati principali hanno evidenziato maggiori livelli sia di compulsività che di 
impulsività nei pazienti con GAP rispetto ai controlli sani. Inoltre, i tre gruppi clinici si 
sono caratterizzati per punteggi molto simili tra loro nei questionari di autovalutazione, 
sia rispetto alle caratteristiche compulsive che a quelle impulsive. I tre gruppi clinici 
non hanno dimostrato la presenza di deficit nell’abilità della risposta motoria. Per 
quanto riguarda i processi di presa decisionale, invece, i pazienti con GAP e i dipendenti 
da alcol hanno mostrato una prestazione complessivamente deficitaria rispetto ai 
controlli sani, mentre nei pazienti con DOC non si sono riscontrate difficoltà. La 
prestazione dei giocatori d’azzardo e dei dipendenti da alcol si è caratterizzata per un 
declino verso la fine della prova, il che è indicativo della presenza di deficit nei  
processi di mantenimento dell’apprendimento: entrambi i gruppi tendono quindi a 
preferire le scelte svantaggiose a quelle vantaggiose. 
Dal confronto tra pazienti con GAP e croupier è emerso che i primi si 
caratterizzavano per la presenza di compulsività rispetto agli individui sani, mentre i 
secondi non hanno mostrato differenze rispetto ai controlli. Sia i giocatori che i croupier
hanno invece riportato punteggi di impulsività auto-riferita comparabili e 
significativamente superiori rispetto a quelli ottenuti dal gruppo di controllo. Rispetto 
alle prove cognitive, i tre gruppi hanno ottenuto prestazioni simili. Tuttavia, l’analisi dei 
profili di apprendimento all’IGT ha evidenziato come i pazienti con GAP abbiano 
conseguito una prestazione tendenzialmente deficitaria rispetto agli altri gruppi; inoltre i 
croupier, a differenza dei controlli sani, non hanno mostrato un miglioramento 
nell’ultimo blocco della prova. Ciononostante, tali differenze non raggiungono la 
significatività statistica.  
Sulla base dei presenti risultati, è possibile trarre alcune conclusioni. 
In primo luogo, quanto emerso dalla somministrazione dei questionari di 
autovalutazione suggerisce che sia l’ipotesi dello spettro compulsivo-impulsivo, sia la 
concettualizzazione del GAP come dipendenza comportamentale potrebbero essere 
adeguate ai fini della categorizzazione del disturbo: infatti, caratteristiche di 
compulsività e impulsività coesistono nei pazienti con GAP. Inoltre, le numerose 
somiglianze riscontrate tra pazienti con GAP, individui con DOC e dipendenti da alcol 
forniscono ulteriore sostegno alla possibilità di includere queste tre condizioni in un 
medesimo spettro di disturbi. 
D’altro canto, i risultati ottenuti tramite l’IGT hanno messo in luce che giocatori 
d’azzardo e dipendenti da alcol si caratterizzano per deficit analoghi. Ciò è in linea con i 
dati di letteratura, che riportano la presenza di simili alterazioni nel funzionamento dei 
circuiti cerebrali sottostanti all’abilità di presa di decisione in queste due categorie 
cliniche; da questo punto di vista, quindi, classificare il GAP come una dipendenza 
potrebbe essere più appropriato. I dati emersi dal confronto tra pazienti con GAP e 
croupier sembrano inoltre in linea con tale ipotesi, dal momento che alcuni dei probabili 
fattori di vulnerabilità per le dipendenze (personalità impulsiva e processi di presa 
decisionale potenzialmente alterati) sono stati osservati anche in una categoria di 
individui sani particolarmente a rischio di sviluppare il disturbo. Tuttavia, data la scarsa 
numerosità campionaria, questo risultato è da intendersi come puramente preliminare; è 
auspicabile che ulteriori indagini vadano ad approfondirne la validità. 
Quanto emerso dal presente lavoro consente pertanto di affermare che entrambe 
le classificazioni proposte sono appropriate, a seconda che si utilizzino indicatori 
fenotipici o endofenotipici. La conduzione di altri studi si rende necessaria, al fine di 
chiarire quale sia la categoria diagnostica migliore per l’inquadramento del GAP.  

Abstract
Pathological gambling (PG) is a chronic and progressive condition, defined as 
“persistent and recurrent maladaptive gambling behaviour”; it is currently classified 
among the Impulse control disorders (Not Elsewhere Classified) in the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders – Fourth Edition - Text Revision (DSM-IV-TR). 
The diagnostic criteria for PG resemble those of both Substance use disorders (SUDs) 
and Compulsive disorders (in particular, Obsessive compulsive disorder [OCD]).
The terms compulsivity and impulsivity are interchangeably used to describe 
difficulties in self-control leading to repetitive psychopathological behaviours; 
nonetheless, they represent two distinct constructs. Compulsive behaviours are driven 
by “a tendency to perform unpleasantly repetitive acts in a habitual or stereotyped 
manner to prevent perceived negative consequences, leading to functional impairment”, 
whereas impulsivity has been described as “a predisposition toward rapid, unplanned 
reactions to internal or external stimuli with diminished regard to the negative 
consequences of these reactions to the impulsive individual or others”. Features of both 
compulsivity and impulsivity are involved in PG phenomenology, and a large body of 
literature investigated these aspects mainly making use of clinical observation and 
results obtained through self-report questionnaires. PG can be conceptualized as a 
compulsive-impulsive spectrum disorder or as a behavioural addiction: these two 
theoretical frameworks have been proposed for PG categorization in DSM-5, thus and 
understanding which of them is better suited to PG symptoms is relevant for diagnostic 
classification issues. Although these two approaches are not mutually exclusive, 
adopting one rather than the other has important clinical implications. 
Recently, the importance of integrating phenotypic (i.e. phenomenological) and 
endophenotypic (i.e. behavioural/physiological) indicators in psychodiagnostic 
assessment has been highlighted. Endophenotypes are measures of the individual 
neuropsychological, neurophysiological and biochemical functioning, and consequently 
anomalies in endophenotypes are supposed to reflect impairments in the underlying 
neurocognitive processes. Impairments in motor inhibition ability and difficulties in 
delaying gratification and decision making, which are prefrontally-mediated cognitive 
functions, have been suggested to underlie problems in behavioural regulation (i.e. 
compulsive and impulsive behaviours). From this perspective, both compulsive and 
impulsive behaviours would represent: a. the performance of an action before its 
complete processing or the failure of interrupting already activated actions; b. a 
dysfunction in behavioural choices, which are perpetrated despite bad consequences for 
the individual. Therefore, cognitive measures of motor inhibition and decision making 
abilities may represent promising endophenotipic indicators of behavioural regulation, 
and deficits in these functions are hypothesized to underpin PG, OCD, and SUDs. 
The present dissertation was conducted in the light of these considerations, and 
following the recommendation that directly comparing PGs with OCD patients and 
individuals with SUDs can represent a viable way to identify the most suitable 
classification for PG. 
A group of treatment-seeking PGs was compared with patients with OCD, 
Alcohol dependents (ADs) and healthy controls (HCs) on both self-report 
questionnaires and cognitive measures of compulsivity and impulsivity. The main aims 
were to investigate similarities and differences between clinical groups in such 
measures, as well as potentially different patterns of response in cognitive tasks. The 
Go/Nogo task was used to assess motor inhibition ability, whereas the Iowa Gambling 
Task (IGT) was administered to evaluate decision making processes.  
A preliminary comparison between small groups of PGs and croupiers on the 
same measures was also conducted; croupiers were chosen as gambling represents a 
relevant activity for both groups of individuals, and also in the light of the higher risks 
of developing problem or pathological gambling observed in casino employees than in 
general population. Consequently, the study of compulsivity and impulsivity in 
croupiers may be helpful in identifying the factors potentially involved in the 
development of PG.  
The main results showed that PGs reported higher levels of both self-reported 
compulsivity and impulsivity than healthy individuals. Furthermore, a number of 
similarities between PGs, OCD patients and ADs in the phenotypic measures of both 
dimensions was observed. No evidence of impaired motor inhibition ability in PGs, 
OCD patients or ADs emerged. In regards to decision making processes, deficits in the 
IGT performance were found in PGs and ADs, whereas OCD patients did as good as 
HCs. Both PGs and ADs were characterized by a decline of their performance towards 
the end of the task, which indicated difficulties in the maintenance of learning to shift 
from disadvantageous to advantageous decisions.
The comparison between PGs and croupiers revealed that the former obtained 
higher scores on measures of compulsivity, whereas the latter did not differ from HCs. 
However, both PGs and croupiers reported similar and higher self-reported impulsivity 
than HCs. As regards the cognitive tasks, no significant difference between groups 
emerged; nonetheless, IGT profiles of learning showed that PGs had a poor 
performance and croupiers differed from HCs in that they did not improve in the last 
block of the task. 
Several conclusions may be drawn from present results.  
First of all, data from self-report measures suggest that both the compulsive-impulsive 
spectrum hypothesis and the behavioural addiction one might be adequate for PG 
categorization, as compulsivity and impulsivity co-occur in PGs. Furthermore, the 
numerous analogies emerged between PGs, OCD patients and ADs further support to 
include the three of them in a common spectrum of disorders. 
On the other hand, IGT findings highlighted the presence of similar deficits in 
PGs and ADs. This result is in line with literature reporting dysfunctions in the brain 
circuitry underlying decision making ability, and therefore it supports the 
conceptualization of PG as an addictive disorder. Data emerged from the comparison 
between PGs and croupiers seem also to be consistent with this hypothesis, as probable 
vulnerability factors for addictions (i.e. impulsivity personality trait and potentially 
altered decision making processes) have been observed also in healthy individuals at 
risk for the development of PG. However, given the small samples sizes further studies 
are recommended.
To conclude, results from the present dissertation indicate that both 
classifications are equally appropriate for PG, depending on the adopted indicators. 
Other studies are required to further clarify which is the best diagnostic category for PG.
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Chapter 1 
Pathological gambling 
 
 
1.1. Diagnostic and clinical aspects 
 
1.1.1. Diagnosis 
Pathological gambling (PG) is defined as “persistent and recurrent maladaptive 
gambling behaviour” (American Psychiatric Association [APA], 1994) and is a chronic 
and progressive condition, which was first recognized as a psychiatric disorder in the 
third edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-III; 
APA, 1980). In the DSM-III it was classified among the Impulse control disorders (Not 
Elsewhere Classified), and it maintained this categorization also in the next Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders – Fourth Edition (DSM-IV; APA, 1994) and 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders – Fourth Edition - Text Revision 
(DSM-IV-TR; APA, 2000).   
 The Impulse control disorders (i.e. PG, Trichotillomania, Kleptomania, 
Pyromania, and Explosive-Intermittent Disorder) are grouped together in the light of a 
common essential feature, that is the failure to resist an impulse, urge, or temptation 
(APA, 2000). The diagnostic criteria for PG (Table 1.1) were modeled on those for 
Substance use disorders (SUDs), because of the observed phenomenological similarities 
between PG and SUDs (Lesieur & Rosenthal, 1991): for example, criterion A.2 clearly 
reflects the phenomenon of “tolerance” characterizing SUDs, criterion A.3 refers to 
20
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“relapse”, whereas criterion A.4 is related to the “withdrawal syndrome”. Growing 
evidence supporting the addictive nature of PG have been recently reported (for a 
detailed review, see paragraph 2.4), and “Gambling Disorder” has been proposed to be 
reclassified into the “Substance Use and Addictive Disorders” category in the DSM-5 
(APA, 2012). 
 
 
Table 1.1. DSM-IV-TR diagnostic criteria for PG (Code 312.31). 
A.    Persistent and recurrent maladaptive gambling behaviour as indicated by five (or 
more) of the following:  
1. is preoccupied with gambling (e.g., preoccupied with reliving past gambling 
experiences, handicapping or planning the next venture, or thinking of ways to get 
money with which to gamble) 
2. needs to gamble with increasing amounts of money in order to achieve the desired 
excitement 
3. has repeated unsuccessful efforts to control, cut back, or stop gambling 
4. is restless or irritable when attempting to cut down or stop gambling 
5. gambles as a way of escaping from problems or of relieving a dysphoric mood (e.g., 
feelings of helplessness, guilt, anxiety, depression) 
6. after losing money gambling, often returns another day to get even (“chasing” one’s 
losses) 
7. lies to family members, therapist, or others to conceal the extent of involvement with 
gambling 
8. has committed illegal acts such as forgery, fraud theft, or embezzlement to finance 
gambling 
9. has jeopardized or lost a significant relationship, job, or educational or career 
opportunity because of gambling 
10. relies on other to provide money to relieve a desperate financial situation caused by 
gambling 
B. The gambling behavior is not better accounted for by a Manic Episode. 
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It is to note that some of the DSM-IV-TR criteria for PG also resemble those of 
“compulsive disorders”, i.e. the preoccupation with gambling (criterion A.1) recalls the 
obsessive thoughts typically reported by individuals suffering from Obsessive 
compulsive disorder (OCD); moreover, gambling may be performed as a means to cope 
with negative feelings (criterion A.5): the same mechanism underlies the development 
and maintenance of compulsions (an in-depth description of compulsive aspects of PG 
is provided in paragraph 2.1). 
The DSM-IV-TR diagnostic criteria also take into account all the psychosocial 
problems deriving from pathological gambling behaviours, including marital and 
financial problems, impaired occupational functioning (i.e. absenteeism, job loss, poor 
performance), and resort to illegal acts.  
Criterion B highlights the importance of distinguishing PG from gambling secondary to 
mania, as the phenomenon of “chasing losses” can be observed also in individuals with 
Bipolar disorder (during manic episodes).  
Furthermore, differential diagnosis of PG includes a distinction between “pathological”  
and “social” gambling (that is, individuals no longer gamble after the occurrence of 
adverse consequences) and suggests to verify whether individuals also suffer from 
Parkinson’s disease, as pathological gambling behaviours have been recognized as one 
of the side effects of dopamine agonist administration (Grant & Odlaug, 2010).  
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1.1.2. Co-occurring disorders  
PG frequently occurs in comorbidity with SUDs (Kessler et al., 2008), in 
particular with alcohol (Cunningham-Williams, Cottler, Compton, & Spitznagel, 1998; 
Gerstein et al., 1999; Petry, Stinson, & Grant, 2005; Welte, Barnes, & Wieczorek, 2001) 
and tobacco dependence (Crockford & el-Guebaly, 1998; Grant & Potenza, 2005). Also 
anxiety (Black & Moyer, 1998; Petry et al., 2005) and mood disorders (Grant & Kim, 
2001; Petry et al., 2005; Rømer Thomsen, Callesen, Linnet, Kringelbach, & Møller, 
2009; Kennedy et al., 2010) are quite common in pathological gamblers (PGs), and high 
rates of attempted/completed suicide are reported (Ledgerwood & Petry, 2004). Among 
personality disorders, Obsessive compulsive, Paranoid, and Antisocial are the more 
prevalent within individuals suffering from PG (Petry et al., 2005). Lastly, PGs 
generally report reduced quality of life (Grant & Kim, 2005) and severe health 
problems, especially cardiac and liver diseases (Morasco & Petry, 2006; Morasco, Vom 
Eigen, & Petry, 2006).  
 
1.1.3. The progression of Pathological gambling  
 Lesieur and Rosenthal (1991) provided a descriptive definition of the main 
phases characterizing the “career” of the pathological gambler, based on the original 
model by Custer (1982). PG cannot be intended as a homogenous disorder (see 
paragraph 1.3.6); nonetheless, its clinical course is similar across sufferers and four 
main stages have been identified: 
 1) The “winning” phase. Males are more likely to endorse this phase. Early 
wins, generally a “big one”, strongly foster individuals in engaging with gambling; wins 
are attributed to personal ability rather than to chance, and individuals experience 
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increased self-esteem and a sense of power and omnipotence. Thoughts about potential 
future wins and success are quite frequent in this phase; time is increasingly devoted to 
gamble at the expense of family and friends. In case of losses, experienced as threats for 
their self-esteem, individuals start to “chase” them to the point that “chasing losses” 
becomes a proper obsession. A vicious circle leads gamblers to the next phase. 
 2) The “losing” phase. Losses are unexpected, intolerable, and attributed to bad 
luck; “chasing” is the predominant aspect in this stage. In the attempt to win back 
losses, gamblers begin to bet and lose higher and higher amounts of money; they start to 
ask for money in order to pay creditors, intimate relationships become difficult and 
family members accept to pay debts in return for the promise to stop gambling. 
 3) The “desperation” phase. The individual may engage with illegal activities, 
i.e. frauds, embezzlements, thefts, bad cheques, in order to pay debts: these acts are 
conceived as “short-term” strategies with the idea that an oncoming win will solve the 
situation. Problems with sleep and food, as well as severe troubles with family members 
and public authorities lead the gambler to think about leaving and starting a new life or, 
more frequently, about suicide. 
 4)  The “giving up” phase. Hopelessness is the essential feature of this phase: 
gamblers realize that they will never be able to stop, and they no longer care. They are 
only interested in gambling, no matter if they will lose. After this phase PGs, especially 
those encouraged and supported by their family members or friends, can start to think 
about seeking treatment and trying to reorganize their own lives (Custer, 1982; Lesieur 
& Rosenthal, 1991).  
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1.2. Epidemiology and gender differences 
 
 The precise prevalence rate of PG is still unknown, as only a scarce number of 
large studies has been conducted to date (Kallick, Suits, Deilman, & Hybels, 1979; 
Gerstein et al., 1999; Petry et al., 2005; Welte et al., 2001); the different instruments 
adopted to establish a diagnosis of PG and the diverse time frames characterizing those 
studies further complicate the identification of the exact prevalence of the disorder 
(Grant & Odlaug, 2010). In the United States population, prevalence is estimated 
around 1% (Petry et al., 2005); rates ranging from .42% to 5.45% have been reported 
with respect to various forms of disordered gambling (i.e. PG and problem gambling).  
In Italy, problem gambling prevalence has been found to vary between the .7% 
(EURISPES, 2009) and the 1.2% (EURISPES, 2007), but no systematic prevalence 
study has been conducted to date. 
 The onset of the disorder is generally in adolescence or in early adulthood 
(especially in men; Ibanez, Blanco, De Castro, Fernandez-Piqueras, & Saiz-Ruiz, 
2003a; Shaffer, Hall, & Vander Bilt, 1999); rates tend to decrease in older adults and 
spontaneous recovery is frequent. The course is characterized by periods of abstinence 
and relapse (Grant & Potenza, 2004; Slutske, 2006). PG is more frequent among males 
than females (males:females ratio = 2:1; Petry, 2006; Potenza, 2006). Women usually 
engage in the addictive behaviour at a later age than men, but the progress to 
problematic levels is more quick (“telescoping”; Potenza, 2006; Potenza, Koran, & 
Pallanti, 2009). Male gamblers are more likely to show antisocial personality traits, 
substance abuse, and marital problems than female gamblers (Grant & Odlaug, 2010); 
furthermore, men tend to prefer “strategic” types of gambling (i.e. sports betting, 
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blackjack) than women, and this difference has been attributed to higher levels of 
sensation-seeking behaviours potentially characterizing the former (Potenza et al., 
2001b; Vitaro, Arseneault, & Tremblay, 1997). Lastly, women usually report to gamble 
for self-regulatory purposes (i.e., reducing stress or bad mood), whereas men generally 
do not perform gambling behaviours to obtain such a relief (Grant & Kim, 2001; Ladd 
& Petry, 2002; Potenza et al., 2001b).  
 
  
1.3. Etiology  
 
Johansson, Grant, Kim, Odlaug and Gऺtestam (2009) critically reviewed all the 
literature pertaining the risk factors for PG; they concluded that those most well-
established comprise: a. demographic factors, in particular young age and male gender; 
b. cognitive distortions; c. sensory characteristics, specifically a preference for speed 
and sound (typical of slot machines or video lottery terminals); d. schedules of 
reinforcement; e. delinquency and illegal acts.  
The main etiological factors potentially involved in PG are discussed as follows. 
 
1.3.1. Genetics 
 Results from family studies generally agree in demonstrating that first-degrees 
relatives of PGs are more likely to show PG that first-degrees relatives of unaffected 
individuals (Black, Monahan, Temkit, & Shaw, 2006; Ibanez, Blanco, & Saiz-Ruiz, 
2002), and that people with PG are more likely to have an affected parent (Gambino, 
Fitzgerald, Shaffer, Renner, & Courtage, 1993). Genetics studies also support the notion 
26

of a possible genetic transmission of PG (Eisen et al., 1998; Winters & Rich, 1998). 
Further evidence in regards to genetics are discussed in Chapter 2 (2.3 and 2.4). 
 
1.3.2. Neurobiology 
Neurotransmitters. Studies on neurotransmitter systems have mainly focused on 
noradrenalin (related to aspects of arousal), serotonin (linked to impulsivity and 
behavioural control) and dopamine (associated with reward and reinforcements). 
Increased noradrenalin function (Bergh, Eklund, Sodersten, & Nordin, 1997; Potenza, 
2008; Roy et al., 1988) and decreased serotonin function (Nordin & Eklundh, 1999; 
Potenza, 2008) have been found. Mixed and unclear results regarding the alterations in 
dopamine function (increased vs decreased levels) have been reported (Bergh et al., 
1997; Meyer et al., 2004; Potenza, 2008); studies on PG consequent to treatments with 
dopamine agonist medications in Parkinson’s disease further support the involvement of 
this neurotransmitter in PG (Voon et al., 2007; Weintraub et al., 2006).  
Neurocircuitry. To date, a scarce number of neuroimaging studies have been 
conducted to investigate potential alterations in cerebral structures in regards to PG. 
Potenza et al. (2003b) observed that PGs, compared with control subjects, showed a 
decreased activation in the frontal and orbitofrontal (OFC) cortex, in the caudate, in the 
basal ganglia, and thalamus after viewing gambling scenarios. Moreover, a diminished 
activation of the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) was observed in 
correspondence of the viewing of intense gambling cues. Another study (Potenza et al., 
2003a) also found a decreased activation of the vmPFC in PGs when performing a task 
assessing cognitive control. Reuter et al. (2005) compared PGs and healthy individuals 
in a task simulating gambling and reported that the former were characterized by a 
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deactivation of the right ventral striatum during wins and by a deactivation in the 
vmPFC. Another study highlighted that PGs showed an increased activation of the right 
dorsolateral PFC, right parahippocampal gyrus and left occipital cortex when exposed 
to gambling cues (Crockford, Goodyear, Edwards, Quickfall, & el-Guebaly, 2005). 
Lastly, Hollander et al. (2005) reported higher activations in the cingulate gyrus, the 
putamen, the prefrontal areas and the primary visual cortex in PGs playing a 
computerized blackjack, especially associated with monetary rewards. Studies assessing 
the relationship between impaired decision making ability and cerebral function in PG 
suggested that alterations in the vmPFC (Clark et al., 2008), ventral striatum (Li, Lu, 
D’Argembeau, Ng, & Bechara, 2010), anterior cingulate cortex (Campbell-Meiklejohn, 
Woolrick, Passingham, & Rogers, 2008; Dalley, Everitt, & Robbins, 2011), and insula 
(Clark et al., 2008; Clark, Lawrence, Astley-Jones, & Gray, 2009) function may be 
involved in PG phenomenology.  
Overall, these results suggest the participation of diverse circuitries in PG, such 
as the reward circuitry (ventral striatum, especially the nucleus accumbens), the 
motivational circuitry (PFC, thalamus, basal ganglia), the memory circuitry 
(hyppocampus), and the executive control circuitry (OFC and PFC).   
 Further evidence in regards to neurobiology are discussed in Chapter 2 (2.3 and 
2.4). 
 
1.3.3. Behavioural factors  
 The mechanisms of classical and operant conditioning have been claimed to play 
a crucial role in both enhancing the engagement in gambling behaviours and 
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establishing habitual patterns of gambling (Blaszczynski & Nower, 2002). The main 
implications are discussed as follows. 
Classical conditioning. Gambling is generally associated with increased 
physiological arousal; the environmental cues typically related to gambling behaviours 
(flashing lights, loud noises, the chime of coins) easily become conditioned stimuli, thus 
stimulating physiological arousal and the urge of gamble (Clark, 2010). 
Operant conditioning. The operant mechanisms influence the performance of 
gambling behaviours even more strongly than the classical ones: 
- The main positive reinforcement involved in PG is obviously money. Moreover, other 
typologies of stimuli have been identified as highly rewarding for PGs, and thus as 
potentially implicated in the onset and maintenance of gambling behaviours (McCown 
& Chamberlain, 2000): a. social stimuli (socializing with people sharing the same 
interests); b. material values (for example, drinks for free generally served in casinos); 
c. environmental stimuli (pleasant auditory and visual stimuli); d. cognitive stimuli (the 
“near-misses”); 
- Early and big wins are highly rewarding and drive the individual to gamble again and 
again (Johansson et al., 2009); 
- Intermittent wins are generally allocated on a variable ratio: this intermittent 
reinforcement/reward schedule of reinforcement is particularly resistant against 
extinction and is capable of generating states of physiological arousal, thus it seems to 
be crucial in the development of PG (Blaszczynski & Nower, 2002; Johansson et al., 
2009).  
- Negative reinforcement principles are involved in the maintenance of gambling 
behaviours as negative affects, such as boredom, distress, anxiety or depressive states, 
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are relieved by the exciting nature of gambling (Blaszczynski & Nower, 2002; Clark, 
2010). Furthermore, once the habit is established, resisting the urge to gamble causes 
aversive emotions; at that point, compulsive gambling is performed in order to reduce 
such a distress (Blaszczynski & Nower, 2002). 
 
1.3.4. Cognitive factors  
 Cognitive models of PG highlight the importance of cognitive biases, i.e. 
cognitive distortions, irrational beliefs, and erroneous perceptions, in the development 
and maintenance of the disorder (Ladouceur & Walker, 1996; Toneatto, Blitz-Miller, 
Calderwood, Dragonetti, & Tsanos, 1999). Experimental psychology extensively 
demonstrated that humans generally show difficulties in processing probability and 
randomness (Tversky & Kahneman, 1971); therefore, they are prone to develop such 
cognitive biases which are typically further promoted by the characteristics of gambling 
games (Clark, 2010). The two main cognitive errors displayed by PGs regard 
(Ladouceur, 2004; Toneatto & Gunaratne, 2009): a. gambling outcomes can be 
controlled by the gambler (primary illusory control); b. gambling outcomes are 
predictable by the gambler (secondary illusory control). Cognitive distortions enhance 
the probability of developing a series of irrational beliefs mainly concerning: a. illusion
of control (over-confidence in personal control over the gambling; gambling is intended 
as a game of skill rather than as a game of chance); b. illusory causalities and 
correlations (unrelated events are thought to be associated); and c. interpretative biases 
(attributional biases, i.e. attributing wins to dispositional factors, such as own skills). 
The “Gambler’s Fallacy” and the “Near-miss effect” are two examples of 
phenomena based on the illusion of correlation. The first one consists in the belief that a 
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win is more likely (or “due”) after a long series of losses; the second one refers to the 
temporal proximity between a loss and a win, which is particularly salient to the 
gambler who perceive him/herself to be constantly nearly winning (Griffiths, 1991). 
Both these erroneous beliefs lead the gambler to go on with the gambling, as they give 
him/her the perception of being mastering the game (Clark, 2010).   
Illusions of personal control and illusionary correlations give reason of the 
superstitions characterizing PGs (Jacobsen, Knudsen, Krogh, Pallesen, & Molde, 2007). 
Superstitions have been classified as follows (Toneatto & Gunaratne, 2009): 
- talismanic superstitions, that consist in believing that specific objects are associated 
with good luck and therefore enhance the chance of winning; 
- behavioural superstitions, relying on the belief that performing certain ritual 
behaviours will help in positively affecting the gambling outcomes; 
- cognitive superstitions, referring to the belief that certain mental states can play a role 
in increasing the chance of winning (i.e. optimism, prayer), and to the existence of “hot” 
and “cold” numbers. 
The most common interpretative biases characterizing PGs include: a. the 
evidence that past wins are more easily recalled than past losses (the flashing lights and 
loud noises generally accompanying wins probably mediate this memory bias; Clark, 
2010); b. the idea of having a “winning tendency” mainly due to early wins (which 
determine high expectancies of winning) and to relatively recurrent past wins (Jacobsen 
et al., 2007); and c. the “hindsight bias”, that is attributing a loss to a wrong decision, 
which could have been avoided (Toneatto & Gunaratne, 2009). 
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1.3.5. Social factors 
 Poor economic conditions, low socio-economic status and delinquency have 
been identified among the social factors potentially involved in the development of PG 
(Vitaro, Brendgen, Ladouceur, & Tremblay, 2001; Welte, Barnes, Tidwell, & Hoffman, 
2008). Furthermore, widowed and divorced individuals (Petry et al., 2005), as well as 
people who started to approach gambling in early life (Kessler et al., 2008), are more 
likely to develop problems with gambling. Lastly, increased rates of PG seem to be 
associated with increased availability and legalization of gambling activities (Crockford 
& el-Guebaly, 1998). 
 
1.3.6. An integrate model: The Pathway Model of Gambling 
 The model proposed by Blaszczynski and Nower (2002) represents an attempt to 
integrate neurobiological, personality, developmental, cognitive, behavioural and 
environmental factors, with the aim of providing a conceptual framework capable of 
explaining the onset and the course of PG. The basic idea is that PG is a heterogeneous 
disorder: common ecological, behavioural and cognitive processes underlie gambling 
behaviour but, depending on the involved pathway, three different subtypes of PGs can 
be identified. These distinct typologies differ in regards to demographic features, 
vulnerability factors and etiological processes. 
 The main common variables refer to: a. Availability and access to gambling; 
such a factor guarantees the social acceptance of gambling and incentives individual to 
gamble; b. Classical and operant conditioning; c. Cognitive distortions.  
The three subtypes identified by Blaszczynski and Nower (2002) are supposed to 
lay on a severity continuum in the light of specific vulnerability factors. The model 
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posits that, starting from similar ecological factors, gambling can proceed through one 
of the three postulated pathways; at the end, the conditioning processes and the distorted 
cognitions act so that habituation, chasing and gambling behaviours appear  
phenomenologically similar across the diverse subtypes.  
 The “Behaviourally conditioned problem gamblers” constitute the less severe 
subtype. They are not characterized by premorbid psychological problems or 
vulnerabilities, and their behaviour is mostly affected by the influence of both 
conditioning processes and distorted cognitions. They can start to gamble at any age, 
and gambling is performed for socialization (they go to gamble with family members or 
friends). The loss of control over behaviour is generally a transient state, and the course 
of PG is characterized by an alternation of regular/heavy gambling. Negative affects, 
such as anxiety or depression, may be present as a consequence of the pathological 
behaviour. Individuals included in this category are generally motivated to enter 
treatment and show good compliance. 
 The “Emotionally vulnerable problem gamblers” are characterized by premorbid 
anxiety or mood disorders, impaired coping and problem solving abilities and generally 
report a negative personal history. Their emotional instability is attributed to both 
biological and psychological vulnerabilities. These PGs perform gambling behaviours 
as self-regulatory strategies, in order to escape from negative affects or to increase 
subjective arousal. They are more resistant to treatment, because of the positive and 
negative rewards associated with gambling. 
 The “Antisocial impulsivist problem gamblers” represent the most disturbed and 
severe subtype of PGs. They are characterized by both biological (i.e. neurological or 
neurochemical dysfunctions), and psychological (i.e. high levels of impulsivity and 
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antisocial personality disorder) vulnerabilities. They generally show a series of 
behavioural problems in addition to gambling, such as substance abuse (particularly 
alcohol) and criminal behaviours; their impulsivity is generally worsened by co-
occurring negative emotions. The onset of PG is typically earlier than in the other two 
subtypes and the course is characterized by binge episodes. Motivation and compliance 
to treatment are particularly low. 
 
 
1.4. Treatment 
 
1.4.1. Psychological treatments 
 Behavioural therapy. The main behavioural techniques adopted with PGs deal 
with the identification of gambling triggers and the development of rewarding activities 
alternative to gambling (Grant & Odlaug, 2010). Imaginal desensitization (i.e. aimed at 
resisting/reducing the urges to gamble) has been demonstrated to be an effective 
strategy (McConaghy, Armstrong, Blaszczynski, & Allcock, 1983; 1988; McConaghy, 
Blaszczynski, & Frankova, 1991), but the maintenance of positive outcomes is unclear 
(McConaghy et al., 1988). 
 Cognitive therapy. Cognitive therapy for PG includes psychoeducation, 
irrational cognition awareness training and cognitive restructuring (Grant & Odlaug, 
2010; Toneatto, 2002; Toneatto & Gunartne, 2009). It aims at changing the patient’s 
beliefs regarding perceived control over randomly determined events, and helps the 
patient understand that the laws of probability, rather than ritualistic behavior, control 
the outcome of gambling. The use of self-monitoring diaries is also particularly frequent 
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and aims to educate the patients in identifying the triggers and the consequences of 
gambling behaviours (Toneatto, 2002). Both individual (combined with relapse 
prevention; Ladouceur et al., 2001; Sylvain, Ladouceur, & Boisvert, 1997) and group 
(Ladouceur et al., 2003) cognitive therapy is effective in the short and in the long term.  
 Cognitive-behavioural therapy. Cognitive-behavioural therapy (CBT) for PG 
mainly consists in the integration of the cognitive and behavioural techniques 
previously reported, as well as the inclusion of other specific strategies either to 
improve treatment compliance (i.e. problem solving training, identification of the 
barriers to change), and to cope with daily life stressors (i.e. assertiveness training, 
relaxation techniques). The effectiveness of CBT in the treatment of PG has been 
proved by several randomized control trials (Grant & Odlaug, 2010; Potenza et al., 
2009).  
 Motivational Interviewing. The Motivational Interviewing (Miller & Rollnick, 
1991) is an empathic approach aiming to enhance patients’ motivation to change their 
behaviours and to overcome the ambivalence typically associated with the process of 
change. It is generally used with individuals suffering from SUDs (Potenza et al., 2009). 
Several studies demonstrated its effectiveness also in PGs (Dickerson, Hinchy, & 
England, 1990; Hodgins, Currie, el-Guebaly, & Peden, 2004; Hodgins & Holub, 2007). 
 Gamblers Anonymous. Gamblers Anonymous is a 12-step program for people that 
have a gambling problem, modeled on the Alcoholics Anonymous; it is a self-help group 
where PGs may share their experience and hope with each other that they may solve 
their common problem and help others to recover from a gambling problem (Potenza et 
al., 2009). Positive effects of participation in these groups have been reported (Hodgins, 
Peden, & Cassidy, 2005; Petry et al., 2006). 
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1.4.2. Pharmacological treatments 
 To date, no pharmacological treatment for PG has been officially approved by 
the Food and Drug Administration. Nonetheless, the effectiveness of various 
medications has been tested and promising results have been reported. In the light of the 
heterogeneity of the disorder and of the different cerebral circuits involved in PG 
phenomenology, opioid antagonists, antidepressants, atypical antipsychotics, mood 
stabilizers, and glutamatergic agents have been considered as drugs potentially effective 
in treating PG (Grant & Odlaug, 2010).  
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Chapter 2 
Compulsive and impulsive aspects of Pathological 
gambling: phenomenological features and theoretical 
models 
 
 
To date, the terms compulsivity and impulsivity have been interchangeably used 
in psychiatric, neurologic and psychological literature to describe difficulties in self-
control which lead to repetitive psychopathological behaviours; nonetheless, they 
represent two distinct constructs (Leeman & Potenza, 2012; van den Heuvel et al., 
2010). Compulsive behaviours are defined as repetitive, rigid and stereotyped goal-
directed actions; individuals refer to feel driven to perform them in order to prevent or 
reduce some uncomfortable feelings, such as anxiety and discomfort (APA, 2000). 
Compulsive behaviours are generally anticipated by strong urges, which individuals 
have difficulties to resist. OCD is the prototype of compulsive disorders; nonetheless, 
compulsive features have been claimed to be involved also in SUDs, Personality 
disorders and Schizophrenia (Goldstein & Volkow, 2002; Lubman, Yücel, & Pantelis, 
2004). On the other hand, impulsivity relates to the repetitive execution of maladaptive 
behaviours despite the potentially negative consequences deriving from their 
performance; thus, impulsive acts can be intended as rapid and unplanned reactions to 
particular internal or external stimuli, aimed at obtaining immediate pleasure of 
gratification (Kertzman et al., 2008; Moeller, Barratt, Dougherty, Schmitz, & Swann, 
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2001). All the disorders classified among the ICDs in the DSM-IV-TR are impulsive 
conditions; moreover, impulsivity has been identified as a central feature of certain 
Personality disorders (in particular, Antisocial and Borderline), SUDs, Bipolar disorder 
and Attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder (Grant & Potenza, 2006).  
 Grant and Potenza (2006) highlighted that in psychological and psychiatric 
literature there is a lack of agreement in regards to the relationship between these two 
constructs; some authors argued that compulsive and impulsive traits may co-occur 
among the same psychopathology (Fineberg et al., 2010; Stein & Hollander, 1995), 
whereas other models tend to conceptualize them as two similar but distinct dimensions 
(Leeman & Potenza, 2012).  
 Features of compulsivity and impulsivity are involved in PG phenomenology, 
and different theoretical approaches based on compulsivity and impulsivity have been 
proposed in literature. PG can be mainly conceptualized as a compulsive-impulsive
spectrum disorder or as a behavioural addiction: understanding which of these two 
frameworks is better suited to PG symptoms is relevant for its future diagnostic 
classification in the DSM-5. These two approaches are not mutually exclusive; they 
rather provide different ways to interpret the same compulsive and impulsive 
phenomenological features shown by PGs.  
One of the main risks of trying to define the “most appropriate classification” is 
that clinical and personality psychology frequently provide circular explanations: “[…] 
circular explanation involves using a description of an event as an explanation of that 
same event […] Circular explanations tend to reify the to-be-explained performance 
into a property causing that same performance” (Boag, 2011, pp. 225-227). For 
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example, “PGs are impulsive because they act without considering the consequences of 
their actions”.  
Nonetheless, adopting one framework rather than the other have important 
implications for treatment, and international literature has been working in order to 
identify the most adequate for PG (Potenza et al., 2009).  
 
 
 2.1. Pathological gambling and compulsivity 
 
Compulsive behaviours have been described as driven by “a tendency to perform 
unpleasantly repetitive acts in a habitual or stereotyped manner to prevent perceived 
negative consequences, leading to functional impairment” (Fineberg et al., 2010, p. 
591), or as “actions inappropriate to the situation which persist, have no obvious 
relationship to the overall goal and which often result in undesirable consequences” 
(Dalley et al., 2011; p. 680). Thus, three critical components seem to be involved in 
defining compulsivity: a. persistence of behaviours (perseveration); b. repetitive 
behaviours are goal-oriented, but often they are not logically related with the goal they 
aim to attain; c. performing such behaviours may result in negative consequences. 
From a phenomenological point of view, the three above-mentioned aspects are 
clearly entailed in PGs’ behaviours. As a matter of fact: a. gambling is a repeatedly 
performed behaviour and individuals suffering from this disorder report difficulties in 
both resisting and controlling actions. Moreover, gambling-related behaviours, such as 
getting money to gamble or handicapping, are repetitively performed, thus reflecting 
problems in inhibiting behaviours (Grant & Potenza, 2006; Potenza et al., 2009); b. PGs 
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often report anxiety or sadness as triggers of their gambling (Potenza et al., 2003a). In 
this respect, gambling behaviours resemble the compulsions typical of OCD as they are 
performed with the aim of reducing unpleasant feelings, rather than to fulfill the purpose 
they are supposed to accomplish, i.e. gaining money (Grant & Kim, 2001; Ladd & 
Petry, 2002); c. Impairment deriving from pathological gambling is well-documented 
and impacts on the personal, familial and occupational functioning (Dell’Osso, 
Altamura, Allen, Marazziti, & Hollander, 2006; Grant & Potenza, 2004).         
Other PG phenomenological features have been claimed to be related to the 
dimension of obsessionality/compulsivity. PGs frequently report repetitive and intrusive 
thoughts about gambling, similar to OCD obsessions (Grant & Potenza, 2006; Potenza 
et al., 2009); furthermore, gambling behaviours can be associated with obsessive 
thoughts, and therefore they are performed to reduce the anxiety and distress caused by 
obsessions (APA, 2000; van den Heuvel et al., 2010). Lastly, individuals suffering from 
PG often endorse rituals associated with their gambling, as gambling on certain slot 
machines, wearing particular clothes when gambling, carrying specific objects for good 
luck or betting on “good numbers”; these ritualistic behaviours are the reflection of 
superstitious beliefs and, as a consequence, they are believed to be capable of 
influencing gambling outcomes (Grant & Potenza, 2006; Jacobsen et al., 2007; Toneatto 
& Gunaratne, 2009).         
In order to systematically verify to what extent PG compulsivity features 
resemble those of OCD, some studies investigating OCD symptoms and beliefs in 
samples of PGs (Blaszczynski, 1999; Frost, Meagher, & Riskind, 2001) or directly 
comparing PG and OCD patients in regards to these constructs (Anholt et al., 2004; 
Bottesi, Ghisi, Boz, Sica, & Sanavio, 2011a) were conducted. The self-report measures 
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used in these studies are questionnaires originally developed to assess OCD symptoms 
and beliefs: 
1) The Padua Inventory (Sanavio, 1988), comprising 4 subscales measuring 
obsessions and compulsions: Impaired control over mental activities (assesses excessive 
doubting and ruminations), Washing, Checking, and Impaired control over motor 
activities (measures urges and worries associated with motor behaviour, i.e. violent 
impulses);  
2) The Yale-Brown Obsessive Compulsive Scale (Y-BOCS; Goodman et al., 
1989), investigates several dimensions in relation to obsessions and compulsions, i.e. 
time spent, interference, distress, resistance, and control associated with OCD 
symptoms, and provides three scores (Obsessions, Compulsions, and Total score); 
3) The Obsessive Compulsive Inventory-Revised (OCI-R; Foa et al, 2002), 
measures the distress caused by OC symptoms. The inventory is made up of six 
subscales: washing, checking, ordering, obsessing, hoarding, and mental neutralizing; 
4) The Obsessive Beliefs Questionnaire (OBQ; Obsessive Compulsive 
Cognitions Working Group [OCCWG], 1997; 2001), assessing six domains of core 
dysfunctional beliefs believed to play a crucial role in the onset and maintenance of 
OCD: Perfectionism, Inflated responsibility, Over-importance of thoughts, Control of 
thoughts, Overestimation of threat, and Intolerance of uncertainty.  
Blaszczynski (1999) found that PGs obtained significantly higher scores on the 
Impaired control over mental activities and the Impaired control over motor activities 
subscales of the Padua Inventory than a group of healthy controls; on the contrary, no 
differences between groups in the Washing and Checking subscales emerged. Frost et 
al. (2001) compared pathological and light gamblers on the Y-BOCS and observed 
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higher OCD symptom severity, as measured by the three scores, in the former than in 
the latter. Furthermore, PGs reported more avoidance behaviours and urges to engage in 
violent behaviours to themselves and others than the other group.  
Anholt et al. (2004) directly compared PGs and OCD patients making use of the 
Padua-R (a revised version of Padua Inventory; van Oppen, Hoekstra, & Emmelkamp, 
1995) and the OBQ; they also included a clinical (panic disorder) and a nonclinical 
control group. Main results revealed that PGs showed significantly lower levels of OCD 
symptom severity (Padua-R) than OCD patients, whereas their scores were similar to 
those obtained by healthy participants; nonetheless, they reported scores similar to those 
of OCD patients, and significantly higher than those of the control groups, in all the 
OBQ domains, except for Overestimation of threat. Consistently, Bottesi et al. (2011a) 
found that OCD patients showed higher OCD symptom severity, as measured by the 
OCI-R, than both PG and healthy control groups; moreover, OCD and PG groups 
obtained comparable and significantly higher scores on the Perfectionism and Excessive 
control of thoughts subscales of OBQ-R (Dorz, Novara, Pastore, Sica, & Sanavio, 2009; 
Novara, Dorz, Pastore, Sica, & Sanavio, 2011) than controls.  
Findings from these studies are mixed, but overall they support the presence of 
specific compulsive-related aspects in PGs. In particular, compulsivity features emerged 
in the forms of fears of losing control over both mental and physical behaviour and 
dysfunctional cognitive beliefs related to perfectionism and control of thoughts; this last 
result is in line with the typically present illusions of control over gambling outcomes 
and cognitive superstitions characterizing pathological gamblers (Toneatto & 
Gunaratne, 2009). 
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2.2. Pathological gambling and impulsivity 
 
Impulsivity is a multifaceted construct which has been described as “a 
predisposition toward rapid, unplanned reactions to internal or external stimuli with 
diminished regard to the negative consequences of these reactions to the impulsive 
individual or others” (Moeller et al., 2001; p. 1784). As for compulsivity, key issues 
emerge from this definition: a. predisposition: impulsivity is intended as part of a 
complex behavioural pattern, rather than as a single action; b. lack of 
planning/premeditation: impulsive behaviours occur in the absence of a conscious 
judgment of the consequences of actions. This is a critical aspect because lack of 
forethought differentiates impulsive behaviours from compulsive ones, in that the latter 
imply planning before actions are performed (Moeller et al., 2001). 
Two main dimensions underlying impulsive behaviours have been recently identified: 
difficulties in inhibiting/interrupting behaviours and problems involving behavioural 
choices, referring to more and less automatic (i.e. non conscious) processes, 
respectively (Dalley et al., 2011; Potenza & Wit, 2010; see chapter 3). Independent of 
the dimension considered, the aim of impulsive behaviours is the pursuit of reward 
(Leeman & Potenza, 2012). 
The phenomenology of PG is clearly characterized by impulsive features: PGs 
show problems in self-regulating their behaviour, and specifically in inhibiting the urge 
for gambling (Goudriaan, Oosterlaan, De Beurs, & Van den Brink, 2007). Moreover, 
they continue to perform risky behaviours, i.e. gambling, despite the knowledge of 
having a persistent problem and the related adverse consequences (el-Guebaly, Mudry, 
Zohar, Tavares, & Potenza, 2011). Harm to occupation and personal/familiar 
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relationships (mainly due to chasing losses and laying about losses), seek a financial 
bailout, committing illegal acts to obtain money are some examples of negative 
consequences of pathological gambling (MacLaren, Fugelsgang, Harrigan, & Dixon, 
2011). Lastly, gambling is considered a reward-seeking behaviour by individuals 
suffering from PG, who often report to gamble to achieve excitement and gratification 
(Blasczczynski, 1999; Grant & Kim, 2003; Schmitz, 2005); thus, endorsing gambling 
activities is generally ego-syntonic and hedonistic in nature for PGs, and urges to 
gamble are generally described as pleasurable, at least in the first phases of the disorder 
(Potenza et al., 2009; Stein & Lochner, 2006). All these phenomenological features 
clearly parallel those characterizing SUDs, and this is why PG has been suggested to be 
conceptualized as a behavioural addiction (Holden, 2001; Petry, 2006; Potenza, 2006). 
Further analogies between PG and SUD will be discussed in paragraph 2.4. 
 A number of studies investigated self-reported impulsivity among PGs (for a an 
exhaustive meta-analytical review, see MacLaren et al., 2011). Different definitions of 
impulsivity and compulsivity have been provided in psychological literature, and 
different facets of those constructs have been stressed on the basis of the adopted 
theoretical framework. As a consequence, several self-report measures aimed at 
assessing these personality features have been developed, and each of them emphasizes 
different constitutive dimensions of both constructs. A brief description of the main 
instruments employed to assess impulsive features is provided as follows:  
1) The Eysenck Personality Questionnaire (EPQ; Eysenck & Eysenck, 1975), 
measures a general impulsivity factor (broad impulsiveness), which is constituted by 4 
different personality traits: risk-taking, non-planning, liveliness and narrow 
impulsiveness. The last one refers to impulsive behaviours such as acting before 
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thinking or not considering both pros and cons of actions before performing them 
(Eysenck & Eysenck, 1977); 
2) The Big Five Questionnaire (BFQ; Caprara, Barbaranelli, Borgogni, & 
Perugini, 1993), defines two different personality dimensions involving impulsive 
aspects: neuroticism, which refers to the individual’s abilities of both inhibiting 
impulsive reactions in conflictual situations and regulating emotions and anxiety; 
conscientiousness, which depicts two traits involved in impulse control, i.e. scrupulosity 
(reliability and precision) and persistence (ability to complete tasks and commitments); 
3) The Sensation Seeking Scale (SSS; Zuckerman, 1971), focuses on the 
construct of sensation seeking, defined as the need of novelty, various and complex 
sensations and experiences. Therefore, it assesses the tendency to take physical or social 
risks to achieve those sensations. The sensation seeking dimension comprises four 
personality traits: thrill- and adventure-seeking, experience-seeking, disinhibition and 
boredom susceptibility;  
4) The Temperament and Character Inventory (TCI; Cloninger, Svrakic, & 
Przybeck, 1993), is quite often used to measure novelty seeking, harm avoidance, 
reward dependence and persistence. All these personality traits are relevant to both 
impulsivity and compulsivity; 
5) The Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (BIS-11; Barratt, 1965; Patton, Stanford, & 
Barratt, 1995), measures 3 different dimensions of impulsivity: motor activation, which 
reflects the tendency to act without thinking; attention, referring to a lack of 
concentration/attention and to impulsive decision making; lack of planning, which 
expresses a poor orientation towards future (Patton et al., 1995). 
46

6) The Urgency, Premeditation, Perseverance and Sensation Seeking (UPPS; 
Whiteside, Lynam, Miller, & Reynolds, 2005), integrates 4 dimensions of impulsivity 
assessed by most of the self-report measures previously described: Negative urgency; 
Low premeditation; Low perseverance; Sensation seeking.        
In the last decade, two models of impulsivity have been developed with the aim 
of integrating all the dimensions investigated by these self-report measures into a whole 
framework: the Urgency, Premeditation, Perseverance and Sensation Seeking Model 
(UPPS; Whiteside & Lynam, 2001) and the Hierarchical Structural Model (HSM; 
Markon, Krueger, & Watson, 2005). The UPPS model comprises an empirically derived 
set of four dimensions of impulsivity: i) Negative urgency, reflecting the tendency 
towards emotionally motivated rash actions. It is associated with the Urgency facet of 
Neuroticism of the BFQ and the Attention scale of the BIS-11; ii) Low premeditation, 
which refers to the tendency to act without thinking about consequences of behaviours 
and is positively associated with the Eysenck Impulsivity Scale of the EPQ, the 
Impulsiveness scale of the TCI, and the Nonplanning scale of the BIS-11, whereas it is 
negatively associated with the Deliberation sub-dimension of the Conscientiousness 
scale of the BFQ; iii) Low Perseverance, which reflects the tendency to interrupt non-
rewarded behaviours and is associated with high scores on the Boredom susceptibility 
scale of the SSS and with low scores on the Self-discipline facet of the 
Conscientiousness scale of the BFQ; iv) Sensation seeking, referring to the tendency to 
engage in sensation-seeking behaviours. It is associated with high scores on the 
Venturesomeness scale of the EPQ, the Excitement seeking facet of the Extraversion 
scale of the BFQ, and the Disinhibition scale of the SSS.  
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Differently, the HSM put together a variety of personality traits related to impulsivity, 
as measured by self-report questionnaires, and two measures of personality disorders: 
the Schedule for Nonadaptive and Adaptive Personality (SNAP; Clark, 1993) and the 
Dimensional Assessment of Personality Pathology (DAPP; Livesley & Jackson, 2002). 
Four levels of analysis of personality structure have been identified. The third one is 
particularly relevant to PG, as it includes personality dimensions defined 
Unconscientious disinhibition and Disagreeable disinhibition, and it comprises features 
similar to the psychological traits measured by the Neuroticism, low Agreeableness, and 
low Consciousness facets of the BFQ; the Harm avoidance, low Cooperativeness, and 
Novelty seeking of the TCI; the Neuroticism-anxiety, Agression-hostility, and the 
Impulsive sensation seeking dimensions of the Alternative Five model by Zuckerman, 
Kuhlman, Joireman, Teta and Kraft (1993).  
The meta-analysis by MacLaren et al. (2011) was conducted on 44 studies which 
investigated impulsivity traits among PGs; they adopted the UPPS and the HSM as 
theoretical frameworks for literature search; therefore, they included all the studies that 
made use of the previously described self-report measures assessing impulsivity. 
Substantial effects for personality features related to the Negative Urgency and Low 
Premeditation factors emerged, whereas no effects for the traits associated with Low 
Perseverance and Sensation Seeking ones were found. Furthermore, in regards to the 
levels of HSM the analysis revealed significant effects for the traits associated with 
Unconscientious disinhibition, Disagreeable disinhibition, and Negative Affect 
(Neuroticism) dimensions.  
To summarize, self-reported impulsivity has been demonstrated to represent a 
crucial personality dimension in relation to PG. Specifically, results from a broad meta-
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analysis highlighted that a. acting on the spur of the moment, b. acting without thinking, 
and c. affective states related to neuroticism are relevant in characterizing PG 
personality profile. On the contrary, the psychological traits associated with sensation-
seeking did not result as much important (MacLaren et al., 2011). 
 
 
2.3. The Compulsive-impulsive spectrum hypothesis 
 
Several authors observed that the need to perform particular behaviours in a 
rigid, repeated and stereotyped manner was a clinical characteristic shared by a number 
of psychopathological disorders; therefore, they hypothesized that these disorders could 
be part of a compulsive-impulsive spectrum and proposed a dimensional trans-
nosographic model (Hollander & Wong, 1995a; 1995b; McElroy, Phillips, & Keck, 
1994; Oldham, Hollander, & Skodol, 1996). In addition to phenomenological 
resemblances, these disorders were found to be also similar in regards to the underlying 
genetic, chemical, immunological, and anatomical substrates (Stein, 2000).  
Compulsivity and impulsivity were defined as the two opposite poles of such a 
continuum; as a consequence, the disorders mainly characterized by harm and risk 
avoidance, increased levels of anxiety and difficulties in the inhibition of behaviours 
were located on the compulsive end, whereas those typified by risk and pleasure 
seeking, lack of control and behavioural disinhibition were located on the impulsive one 
(Hollander & Wong, 1995a; 1995b). The disorders originally included in this continuum 
were: OCD (compulsive pole), Hypochondriasis, Body dismorphic disorder, Anorexia, 
Depersonalization disorder, Tourette syndrome, Trichotillomania, Pathological 
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occur simultaneously in the same disorder, or at different time points within the same 
disorder (Grant & Potenza, 2006). In other words, some OCD patients might score high 
both in compulsivity and impulsivity measures, whereas individuals suffering from 
other disorders included in the spectrum might show a reversed pattern (Fineberg et al., 
2010; Lochner & Stein, 2006; Stein, 2000; Stein & Hollander, 1995). 
Recent literature seems to support this perspective. For example, Ettelt et al. 
(2007) observed high levels of cognitive impulsiveness among OCD patients; in 
particular, measures of cognitive impulsiveness were associated with aggressive 
obsessions and checking behaviours. Furthermore, Potenza (2007) compared PGs, OCD 
patients and healthy controls on self-report measures and found that both clinical groups 
reported high levels of both impulsivity and harm avoidance. Evidence supporting the 
complex relationship between compulsivity and impulsivity in PG also emerged in a 
study by Blanco et al. (2009), which examined the changes in compulsive and impulsive 
features among PG individuals after 12 weeks of treatment with paroxetina; PGs were 
administered the Padua Inventory previous and after treatment. Results revealed 
significant decreases in the Impaired control over mental activities subscale (a measure 
of obsessionality/compulsivity), as well as in the Impulsiveness subscale of the EPQ, 
after treatment; furthermore, PG symptom severity after treatment was correlated only 
with changes in the Impulsiveness scale scores. These results suggest that compulsivity 
and impulsivity interact in a complex fashion, as both dimensions had relevance with 
respect to treatment outcome, but impulsivity emerged as more related with gambling 
severity  (Blanco et al., 2009).     
Lastly, neuroanatomical models highlighting the overlap between two distinct 
functional systems support the notion of the compulsive-impulsive spectrum (Fineberg 
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et al., 2010). In the compulsive circuit, the caudate nucleus is thought to drive 
compulsive behaviours, whereas the OFC would play a role in controlling and inhibiting 
them; in the same way, the ventral striatum/nucleus accumbens shell would drive 
impulsive behaviours, while the anterior cingulate/vmPFC might control and inhibit 
them in the impulsive circuit. These two circuits are interconnected and differentially 
modulated by neurotransmitters (Brewer & Potenza, 2008; Robbins, 2007). Therefore, 
the tendency to perform compulsive or impulsive acts is supposed to depend on 
anomalies in these cerebral structures: specifically, hyperactivity in the striatal 
components or hypoactivity in the prefrontal regions (Fineberg et al., 2010). 
 
Some studies provided only moderate support to the inclusion of PG into the 
compulsive-impulsive spectrum. For example, Kim and Grant (2001) investigated 
novelty seeking, reward dependence, and harm avoidance traits among PG individuals, 
OCD patients and healthy controls: PGs reported higher levels of novelty seeking, 
impulsiveness, and extravagance, whereas showed less anticipatory worry, harm 
avoidance, and fear of uncertainty than OCD patients. The Authors concluded that the 
two disorders were characterized by more difference than similarities in personality 
traits, thus suggesting substantial differences between PG and OCD; however, they 
pinpointed that analyzing these results form a dimensional personality perspective may 
be overinclusive (Kim & Grant, 2001). Other two studies comparing PGs’ and OCD 
patients’ personality characteristics (Anholt et al., 2004; Bottesi et al., 2011a) only 
partially sustained the compulsive-impulsive spectrum hypothesis, in that no similarities 
in (symptomatic) compulsivity measures emerged. A recent meta-analytical study 
assessing the relationship between PG and OCD was performed with the aim to test the 
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validity of the compulsive-impulsive spectrum hypothesis (Durdle, Gorey, & Stewart, 
2008). Comorbidity, familiarity, and prevalence issues were taken into account. In line 
with the compulsive-impulsive spectrum hypothesis, a strong relationship between PG 
and OCD traits was observed; furthermore, low effect sizes for comorbidity rates 
between disorders emerged, thus suggesting that the two psychopathologies are distinct 
but share common features. Nonetheless, no data supporting familiarity between 
disorders were found. In the light of these results, Durdle et al. (2008) stated that the 
inclusion of PG in the compulsive-impulsive spectrum was only partially supported. 
Furthermore, a number of evidence in contrast with this proposal have been 
reported. Some argue that one of the main arguments for not including PG and OCD 
into the same classification is that gambling behaviours are mainly driven by the 
research of pleasure and gratification; therefore, PG sufferers often experience ego-
syntonic feelings. On the contrary, OCD symptoms are ego-dystonic in nature, as 
distress and fears of harm usually motivate performing compulsions and regret and guilt 
frequently follow compulsive behaviours (Potenza et al., 2009).  
In addition, results concerning rates of co-occurrence between PG and OCD are 
inconsistent: the rate of comorbid OCD in PG patients was found to range between 1% 
to 20% (Argo & Black, 2004); nonetheless, the St. Luis Epidemiologic Catchment Area 
study (Cunningham-Williams et al., 1998) failed in detecting relationships between the 
disorders, as an odd-ratio of .6 emerged. Also studies investigating the occurrence of 
PG in samples of OCD patients did not reveal important relationships between 
disorders: Grant, Mancebo, Pinto, Eisen and Rasmussen (2006b) found low rates of 
both current and lifetime prevalence of PG (.3% and 1%, respectively); rates of both 
current and past PG lower than 1% were observed by Hollander et al. (1997) in a 
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sample of 2000 OCD patients. Furthermore, two family studies (Bienvenu et al., 2000; 
Black, Moyer, & Schlosser, 2003) did not find associations between PG and OCD.  
Genetic and neurobiological studies also provided findings mainly supporting 
differences rather than analogies between PG and OCD. The allelic variants of the 5HT 
transporter gene have been observed in both PG and OCD, but the short allele was 
found to be associated with PG, whereas the long one was associated with OCD 
(Hemmings & Stein, 2006; Ibanez, De Castro, Fernandez-Piqueras, & Saiz-Ruiz, 
2003b); furthermore, several studies did not observe alterations of this allele (reviewed 
by Hemmings and Stein, 2006). Hyperactivity in the frontostriatal circuitry 
characterizes OCD (Mataix-Cols & van den Heuvel., 2006), whereas hypoactivity in the 
same circuitry has been observed in PG (Reuter et al., 2005; Potenza, 2006). A different 
involvement of the same neurotransmitters also distinguishes PG from OCD: in the 
former, pro-serotoninergic agents improved mood leading to euphoric states (Potenza & 
Hollander, 2002), whereas in the latter they worsened symptoms (Pauls, Mundo, & 
Kennedy, 2002). Consequently, Selective Serotonin Re-uptake Inhibitors (SSRI) are the 
gold standard pharmacological treatment for OCD, whereas their utility in PG is less 
clear (Potenza et al., 2009).   
 
 
2.4. Pathological gambling as a Behavioural addiction 
 
 The term addiction derives from the Latin addicere, which means “bound to” or 
“enslaved by”, and psychiatric and psychological literature traditionally adopted it when 
referring to impaired control over substance use behaviours (Maddux & Desmond, 
2000). More recently, this expression has been extended to other behaviours 
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characterized by difficulties in behavioural regulation which lead to harmful effects; in 
this respect, the term addiction seems more appropriate than dependence, as it also 
includes the adverse consequences on individual, familiar and social spheres that are 
usually related to these behaviours (Potenza, 2006).  
Potenza (2006) identified three core elements of addiction: a. craving states 
preceding behaviours; b. impaired control over behaviours; c. continued behavioural 
engagement in spite of negative consequences. This definition fits with the 
phenomenological features of PG, therefore it has been suggested to consider it as a 
behavioural/nonsubstance addiction that is, addiction to non-drug behaviours 
(Frascella, Potenza, Brown, & Childress, 2010; Holden, 2001; Petry, 2006; Potenza, 
2006), with possible re-categorization in DSM-5 among the “Substance Use and 
Addictive Disorders” (APA, 2012).  
A review of the main evidence supporting the idea of PG as a behavioural 
addiction is provided. 
Phenomenology. PGs, as well as drug addicts, frequently report the occurrence 
of tolerance and withdrawal symptoms. Tolerance symptoms in PG consist in the need 
for increased intensity of gambling over time, and urges/cravings to gamble are 
frequently experienced while abstaining from the behaviour, thus defining a withdrawal 
syndrome (Blanco, Moreyra, Nunes, Saiz-Ruiz, & Ibanez, 2001; Grant, Brewer, & 
Potenza, 2006a). Repeated unsuccessful to control, cut back or quit gambling, as well as 
feeling irritable and restlessness when trying to reduce or stop the behaviours are 
frequently endorsed by PGs (Potenza, 2006); it is noteworthy that all these aspects are 
currently reported as inclusionary diagnostic criteria in the DSM-IV-TR (APA, 2000).  
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 As previously discussed, there is evidence that PG sufferers are characterized by 
both impulsive and compulsive features. Differently from the compulsive-impulsive 
hypothesis, which posits the co-occurrence of impulsive and compulsive traits within 
disorders, the most recent models of addiction suggest the involvement of an 
“impulsivity-compulsivity shift” in addictive behaviours (Brewer & Potenza, 2008; 
Dalley et al., 2011; Everitt & Robbins, 2005; Fineberg et al., 2010; Potenza, 2008). This 
means that addictive behaviours are originally novelty/reward driven and motivated by 
positive reinforcement mechanisms (impulsive); later, impulsive behaviours shift to 
compulsivity that is, they become more habit-driven and they are performed because 
they are negatively rewarded (el-Guebaly et al., 2011; Leeman & Potenza, 2012). As a 
matter of fact, in the first stages PG symptoms are ego-syntonic in nature: pleasure, 
relief and gratification are the most important drives to gamble (APA, 2000). However, 
the motivational factors underlying gambling behaviour tend to change over time: 
initially, PGs gamble to earn money; later, they report to gamble “just to gamble”; 
finally, they need to gamble in order to reduce the urges to gamble and the associated 
distress (Brewer & Potenza, 2008; Chambers, Bickel, & Potenza, 2007). Therefore, PG 
symptomathology tends to shift towards ego-dystony, which is also due to the 
awareness of the difficulties in refraining from gamble, as well as the negative 
consequences of gambling behaviours. Nonetheless, it is worthy to note this shift from 
impulsive to compulsive behaviours can be differently defined as “the occurrence of 
compulsivity and impulsivity at different time points”, as stated in the compulsive-
impulsive spectrum hypothesis (Grant & Potenza, 2006).    
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 Lastly, both PGs and drug dependents usually report high scores in self-report 
measures of impulsivity (Blaszczynski, Steel, & McConaghy, 1997; Potenza et al., 
2003b; 2009). 
 Epidemiology. PG resembles SUDs also in regards to gender differences. Males 
are more likely to present the disorder than females: the observed men:women ratio is 
2:1, which similar to that characterizing SUDs, in particular alcoholism (Petry, 2006; 
Potenza, 2006; Potenza, Kosten, & Rounsaville, 2001a; Potenza et al., 2001b); it is to 
note that the males:females ratio for OCD is lower (1:1; APA, 2000). Another 
commonality with alcohol dependence (AD) is the gender-related phenomenon of 
“telescoping” (Lynch, Roth, & Carroll, 2002; Potenza et al., 2001a; 2001b; Tavares, 
Zilberman, Beites, & Gentil, 2001). Furthermore, clinical course of PG and SUDs is 
also quite similar. Higher rates of the disorder are generally observed in adolescence 
and young adulthood, whereas they tend to be low in old adulthood (Chambers & 
Potenza, 2003; Shaffer, Hall, & Vander Bilt, 1999a; Wagner & Anthony, 2002). In 
particular, many people tend to spontaneously recover at later ages (Slutske, Jackson, & 
Sher, 2003).  
 Lastly, high rates of comorbidity between PG and SUDs have been found 
(Crockford & el-Guebaly, 1998; Grant & Potenza, 2004; McCormick, Russo, Ramirez, 
& Taber, 1984; Petry et al., 2005). PGs make use of more tobacco and alcohol, and are 
more likely to fulfill the criteria for tobacco/alcohol abuse and/or dependence, than non-
gamblers (Cunningham-Williams et al., 1998; Kessler et al., 1994). For example, Petry 
et al. (2005) observed comorbid alcohol use disorder in 70% of PGs, whereas over 30% 
of PG sufferers reported a SUD. Furthermore, substance abusers frequently also suffer 
from PG (Petry, 2001; Spunt, Lesieur, Hunt, & Cahill, 1995).  
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 Social factors. Similar social factors are involved in both PG and SUDs: both 
disorders impact a large social network, including family, friends, colleagues and 
social/health services (Lobsinger & Beckett, 1996; Potenza, 2006). Moreover, cultural 
attitudes can influence the endorsement of gambling and substance use (i.e. tobacco 
smoking, alcohol consumption), as they are culturally-based and socially accepted 
(Potenza et al., 2001a); an association between increased rates of PG and increased 
availability and legalization of gambling activities has been observed (Crockford & el-
Guebaly, 1998). 
Genetics and neurobiology. Results from a twin epidemiological study suggest a 
genetic link between PG and SUDs, in particular alcoholism: data from the Vietnam Era 
Twin registry reported that the 12-20% of genetic and the 3-8% of environmental risks 
for PG overlapped with those of AD (Shah, Eisen, Xian, & Potenza, 2005; Slutske et al., 
2000). Similarities between PG and SUDs have also been suggested by molecular 
genetic studies: increased frequency of the D2A1 allele of the D2 dopamine receptor 
gene was found in PGs, and even higher frequencies were observed in PGs with 
comorbid SUDs (Comings, 1998). It is to note that this allele is associated with 
impulsive, compulsive, and addictive behaviours (Blum et al., 1995).  
In regards to biochemistry, serotoninergic (Fineberg et al., 2010; Potenza, 2001; 
Schlosser, Black, Repertinger, & Freet, 1994) and dopaminergic (Grant et al., 2006a) 
deficits seem to underlie both PG and AD symptoms. Furthermore, dysregulations in 
the endogenous opioids system are supposed to be involved in both PG and alcohol use 
disorders (Grant et al., 2006a); consistently, opioid antagonists such as naltrexone and 
nalmefene are effective in reducing both PG- and alcohol-related symptoms (Grant et 
al., 2006c; Kim, Grant, Adson, & Shin, 2001; Mason, Salvato, Williams, Ritvo, & 
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Cutler, 1999). Shared neurocircuitry is also supposed to underlie both PD and SUDs: 
anomalies in frontostriatal circuits’ functioning, and specifically diminished activation 
in the vmPFC and in the dopaminergic mesolimbic pathway linking the ventral 
tegmental area to the nucleus accumbens, are hypothesized to be responsible of the 
impulsive choice and reward-seeking behaviours characterizing both SUDs and PG 
(Everitt & Robbins, 2005; Potenza, 2006; 2008; Reuter et al., 2005; Volkow & Fowler, 
2000; Williams & Potenza, 2008; Wrase et al., 2007).  
 Psychological treatments. Psychological and behavioural interventions 
originally developed to treat SUDs have been also introduced in the treatment of PG 
(Brewer et al., 2008; Petry, 2005). The most effective are: the 12-step program 
Gamblers Anonymous, modeled after Alcoholics Anonymous; motivational 
enhancement and interviewing, and cognitive behavioural therapy (Potenza et al., 2009). 
 
 
2.5. Alternative models 
The “addictive” or “reward dependent” spectrum 
Several psychopathological conditions have been suggested to be included in a 
spectrum of disorders characterized by “reward dependent” behaviours, driven by 
preoccupations, urges or cravings. These are: alcohol and substance abuse, PG, Eating 
disorders, Hypersexual behaviour, and excessive physical exercise (Lochner & Stein, 
2006). The inclusion of OCD in such a framework was controversial; nonetheless, 
several authors highlighted a number of phenomenological commonalities between 
OCD and, for example, AD (Anton, 2000; Modell, Glaser, Cyr, & Mountz, 1992). In 
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particular, similar difficulties in behavioural inhibition have been suggested to underlie 
both disorders, thus OCD compulsions and alcohol cravings would both represent 
failures in motor inhibition ability. Moreover, Vehreul, Van Den Brink and Geerlings 
(1999) identified three different types of alcohol craving: reward craving, relief craving 
and obsessive craving, the latter defined as the loss of control over behaviours 
consequent to alcohol-related obsessional thoughts. Despite such phenomenological 
overlaps between disorders, the idea of this spectrum of addictive disorders has not been 
further developed.  
  
The obsessive-compulsive spectrum
A categorical framework partially consistent with the compulsive-impulsive 
spectrum hypothesis is the Obsessive-compulsive spectrum disorders (OCSDs) 
approach (Hollander, 1993). Several of the disorders included in the ICDs category of 
DSM were grouped into such a spectrum, in consideration of the phenomenological and 
neurobiological commonalities, as well as the patterns of familial transmission and 
treatment responses, shared by these disorders. Later, Hollander and Rosen (1999) 
divided the spectrum into four clusters. One of them was characterized by impulsive 
behaviours, and included PG, Pyromania, Sexual compulsions, and Compulsive buying. 
The main features endorsed by individuals included in this cluster was the experience of 
arousal, pleasure and gratification feelings as a consequence of their behaviours 
(Hollander & Rosen, 1999). Evidence supporting this framework came from a further 
cluster analysis performed by Lochner et al. (2005), who were mainly interested in 
investigating OCD heterogeneity. They suggested that the study of comorbidities could 
represent a promising way to identify OCD symptom subtypes: indeed, different OCD 
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subtypes might be associated with different comorbid psychopathologies, and these 
associations might be due to common underlying biological mechanisms. Furthermore, 
such an approach was thought to represent an useful means to establish which of the 
OCSDs could be classified as more or less closely related to OCD (Lochner & Stein, 
2006). Therefore, a cluster analysis of comorbid OCSDs in patients with a primary 
diagnosis of OCD was performed and three main cluster emerged: “Reward deficiency” 
(comprising PG, Trichotillomania, Tourette syndrome, and Hypersexual disorder), 
“Impulsivity” (comprising compulsive shopping, Kleptomania, and Eating disorders), 
and “Somatic” (comprising Body dismorphic disorder and Hypochondriasis). Cluster I 
was characterized with an earlier onset of OCD, presence of tics, and harm related 
and/or sexual/religious obsessions and compulsions; dopaminergic deficits would be 
involved in the phenomenological features typical of this cluster. A history of childhood 
emotional abuse, prevalence of female gender, higher levels of OCD severity and 
novelty-seeking personality traits typified Cluster II; serotoninergic system dysfunctions 
might be related to this cluster. Lastly, Cluster III resulted associated with somatic 
obsessions and compulsions and poor insight; no specific psychobiological features 
have been related with this cluster (Lochner et al., 2005).  
These results provide interesting ideas concerning the conceptualization of these 
psychological disorders; hypothesizing the existence of different clusters of disorders is 
not in contrast with the compulsive-impulsive spectrum hypothesis. Rather, different 
disorders might lay on different points of the continuum on the basis of the 
characteristics of the cluster they are part of; in this respect, the space defined by the 
OCSDs can be intended as multidimensional (Stein & Lochner, 2006). Furthermore, 
postulating the existence of “Reward deficiency” cluster within the OCSDs allows to 
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consider the possibility of interpreting specific compulsive behaviours as forms of 
behavioural addiction. 
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Chapter 3 
The role of inhibitory control and decision making in 
behavioural regulation:  
An endophenotype approach to Pathological gambling 
 
 
3.1. The endophenotype approach to the study of psychiatric disorders 
 
 Previous chapter focused on the description of compulsive and impulsive aspects 
of PG. This description was mainly based on phenomenology and on studies which 
made use of self-report questionnaires, that are phenotypic indicators. On the other 
hand, endophenotypes can be defined as internal phenotypes, as they are “intermediate 
measures (or markers) between top-level symptoms and bottom-level genetic 
contributions […] closer to the underlying neuropathology than top-level symptoms or 
clinical phenotype” (Chamberlain, Blackwell, Fineberg, Robbins, & Saahakian, 2005, p. 
401). Therefore, endophenotypes are intended as measures of the individual 
neuropsychological, neurophysiological and biochemical functioning; consequently, 
anomalies in endophenotypes are supposed to reflect impairments in the underlying 
neurocognitive processes (Gottesman & Gould, 2003). 
Several authors claimed the importance of integrating phenotypic and 
endophenotypic indicators in psychodiagnostic assessment (Chamberlain et al., 2005; 
Goudriaan et al., 2008), as they can provide information pertaining to different 
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channels, i.e. verbal (subjective) and behavioural/physiological (objective) respectively. 
This is in line with the basic idea that psychological assessment has to be considered in 
its multidimensionality, and horizontal integration (the combination of information 
deriving from different channels) has to be taken into account in order to help the 
clinician in formulating targeted diagnostic hypotheses (Sanavio, Bertolotti, Michielin, 
Vidotto, & Zotti, 2008).  
Self-report measures allow the researcher to collect a great amount of 
information pertaining a wide range of attitudes and behaviours in a short period of 
time, and they give the opportunity to evaluate the subjective experience of clinical 
symptoms; moreover, self-report data analysis permits to identify distinct behavioural 
patterns. Nonetheless, some shortcomings intrinsic in their use are: their reference to 
self-reported behaviours/cognitions (which may not correspond to objective reality); a 
complete certainty about truthfulness of answers is impossible to achieve (reliability is 
lowered); administering them in different time-points can be inadequate (Moeller et al., 
2001). Furthermore, speculating about putative associations between obtained scores 
and underlying neurobiological mechanisms is difficult (Chamberlain & Sahakian, 
2007). On the contrary, the assessment of psychological constructs availing of 
endophenotypic measures, i.e. computerized behavioural tasks, allows the collection of 
more objective data, as well as the possibility to jointly investigate neural correlates 
through neuroimaging or transcranial magnetic stimulation (Chamberlain & Sahakian, 
2007); furthermore, behavioural measures have been found to be sensitive to changes in 
impulsivity during treatment and to be predictive of treatment outcomes as well as 
relapse (Dom, De Wilde, Hulstijn, & Sabbe, 2007; Goudriaan et al., 2008). Gottesman 
and Gould (2003) also stressed the usefulness of employing endophenotypic measures 
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for assessment purposes, as they can be helpful in enhancing the understanding of the 
neurobiology and genetics underlying psychological disorders, thus establishing a 
biological underpinning for diagnosis and classification. 
 
 
3.2. The involvement of motor inhibition and decision making abilities in 
behavioural regulation 
 
 Impairments in motor inhibition ability and difficulties in delaying gratification 
and decision making have been suggested to underlie problems in behavioural 
regulation (i.e. compulsive and impulsive behaviours; Aragues, Jurado, Quinto, & 
Rubio, 2011; Bechara, 2003; Dalley et al., 2011; Dawe, Matthew, & Loxton, 2004; de 
Wit & Richards, 2004; el-Guebaly et al., 2011; Fineberg et al., 2010; Potenza & Wit, 
2010; Yücel & Lubman, 2007). They both are prefrontally-mediated cognitive functions 
(they mainly involve the circuits described in paragraph 2.3). In particular, the tendency 
to pre-potent motor disinhibition is mediated through the right inferior frontal (RIF) 
cortex (and specifically, the pars opercularis, Brodmann area 44) and the basal ganglia 
(and specifically, the globus pallidus), and modulated by the neurotransmitter 
norepinephrine, whereas impulsive decision making is mediated through the OFC and 
subcortical connections, and modulated by serotonin at the cortical level and dopamine 
at the subcortical one (Aragues et al., 2011; Fineberg et al., 2010).  
 The first authors suggesting that these two main dimensions might be involved 
in behavioural dysregulation were Dawe et al. (2004) and de Wit & Richards (2004). 
Through the integration of the most recent personality theories and developments in 
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neurosciences to that time, they identified two components of impulsive/compulsive 
behaviours: a. behavioural disinhibition or rash impulsiveness, which refers to 
difficulties in both initiating and inhibiting motor responses. Consequently, 
impulsive/compulsive behaviours would represent the performance of an action before 
its complete processing and evaluation (“acting without thinking”) or the failure of 
interrupting current actions (problems in response inhibition); b. consequence 
sensitivity or impulsive decision making, referring to impulsivity in terms of 
behavioural choices which are perpetrated despite bad consequences for the individual, 
i.e. preferring to obtain small but immediate rewards rather than big but delayed ones. 
Motor inhibition deficits have been hypothesized to account for impaired decision 
making; nonetheless, research findings are inconsistent (Kertzman, Lidogoster, Aizer, 
Kotler, & Dannon, 2011). 
 
 
3.3. Cognitive measures of motor inhibition and decision making abilities 
 
Cognitive measures of motor inhibition and decision making abilities represent 
promising endophenotypic indicators of behavioural regulation and have been largely 
employed in research on PG (Goudriaan et al., 2008). The mainly used paradigms are 
described below. 
 
3.3.1 Motor inhibition ability 
Among the neuropsychological measures of motor inhibition ability, the 
Go/Nogo task and Stop-Signal task are regarded the most valid and reliable 
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(Chamberlain & Sahakian, 2007; Chambers, Garavan, & Bellgrove, 2009; Oosterlan, 
Logan, & Sergeant, 1998). 
Go/Nogo task 
In the Go/Nogo task (Drewe, 1975) subjects are asked to respond as quickly as 
possible to target stimuli (Go trials), by performing a simple motor response (generally 
pressing a button), and to refrain from responding to distractor cues (Nogo trials). The 
behavioural data usually collected are the number of errors (omissions: the subject does 
not react to the Go stimulus; commissions: the subject reacts to the Nogo stimulus) and 
reaction times (RTs; milliseconds taken to respond to Go stimulus and on Nogo trials). 
Studies with nonclinical subjects found faster RTs on Nogo conditions than on Go 
conditions, suggesting that commission errors may be quick guesses or premature 
responses (Falkenstein, Hoormann, & Hohnsbein, 1999; Falkenstein, Koshlykova, 
Kiroj, Hoormann, & Hohnsbein, 1995). As a consequence, commission errors in the 
Go/Nogo task are generally regarded an index of poor motor inhibition control (Bohne, 
Savage, Deckersbach, Keuthen, & Wilhelm, 2008). 
 
Stop-Signal Task 
The Stop-Signal task (Logan, Cowan, & Davis, 1984) differs from Go/Nogo 
task as it measures the ability of inhibiting a pre-activated motor response. In this task 
subjects are required to perform a visual discrimination task, i.e. emitting different 
motor responses according to the stimuli (go signals) they are presented with. 
Instructions stress that motor reactions have to be as quick as possible. In a number of 
trials, a stop signal (generally, an auditory stimulus) is presented after a go signal: when 
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the stop signal occurs, subjects have to refrain from responding to the go signal. Finally, 
the calculation of an algorithm allows to measure the time internally spent to inhibit the 
pre-activated response; this period of time is defined Stop-Signal Reaction Time 
(SSRT). The longer the SSRT, the more impaired the ability to inhibit motor responses. 
Other behavioural indicators of performance are the number of errors and the mean RTs 
associated with go signals (Logan et al., 1984). 
 
3.3.2. Decision making ability 
One of the mostly used measures of decision making is the Iowa Gambling Task 
(IGT; Bechara, Damasio, Damasio, & Anderson, 1994). It consists of four desks of 
cards that, when turned, reveal a combination of gains and losses (measured in 
monetary rewards). Participants are given an initial budget (usually $2000/2000 €) and 
they are required to increase this amount as much as possible by choosing cards from 
any of the four decks; they are told that they are free to switch from any deck to another. 
The task is designed so that two decks are advantageous, and choosing consistently 
cards from them results in a net gain: wins are quite low, as well as penalty amounts. 
The two advantageous decks are different as one is characterized by a more frequent, 
but smaller in magnitude, punishment than the other. On the contrary, the other two 
decks are considered disadvantageous and choosing consistently from them leads to a 
net loss: each card from the disadvantageous decks can provide high rewards and high 
punishments. As for the two advantageous decks, the punishment is more frequent and 
of smaller magnitude in one deck than in the other. Participants are not told about the 
total number of trials (100) before starting the task, whereas they are informed that 
some of the decks are advantageous and some disadvantageous. A total gain score is 
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computed at the end of the task by subtracting the total number of card selected from the 
advantageous minus disadvantageous decks; the lower the score, the higher the 
impairments in decision making ability. Furthermore, partial net-scores are usually 
computed for each block of 20 cards (Bechara et al., 1994).  
Brand, Recknor, Grabenhorst and Bechara (2007) pinpointed that two types of 
decision making are involved in task execution: a. “under ambiguity decision”, 
characterizing the first phase of task (first 40 trials), as decisions have to be made 
without knowledge of the nature of outcomes and the probability of gains and losses; b. 
“decision under risk”, typical of the second phase (last 60/40 trials), where participants 
should have learnt the risks associated with distinct decks and therefore they should be 
aware of the consequences of choosing from one deck than the other (Brand et al., 2007; 
Kertzman et al., 2011).  
 
 
3.4. Motor inhibition and decision making deficits as putative endophenotypic 
markers of compulsive and impulsive disorders 
 
Motor inhibition deficits are hypothesized to underpin PG, OCD, and SUDs 
(Fineberg et al., 2010), and impaired performance on the IGT has been observed in PG, 
OCD and AD (el-Guebaly et al., 2011). The main evidence are reviewed as follows. 
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3.4.1. Pathological gambling 
Motor inhibition ability 
A few studies investigated motor inhibition ability in PG through Go/Nogo 
paradigms; overall, results support the existence of inhibitory deficits. Goudriaan,
Oosterlaan, de Beurs and Van den Brink (2005) found that PGs, individuals with 
Tourette syndrome and Alcohol dependents (ADs) performed a significantly higher 
number of commission errors than healthy controls; no differences between clinical 
groups emerged. Fuentes, Tavares, Artes and Gorenstein (2006) also observed 
significantly more commission errors in PGs than in healthy controls. Kertzman et al. 
(2008) integrated the Go/Nogo paradigm with the continuous performance test (CPT; 
requires to identify and respond to a Go stimulus) and found that PG sufferers showed 
both more omission and commission errors, as well as slower RTs, than healthy 
controls. Similar results emerged in a later study conducted by the same research group: 
PGs performed more omission errors and were slower than healthy individuals, whereas 
no differences in the number of commission errors emerged (Kertzman et al., 2011). 
Lastly, Bottesi et al. (2011a) observed that both PG sufferers and OCD patients 
executed more omission errors that healthy controls, even when age and education level 
were partialled out. Omission errors are generally considered a measure of inattention 
rather than of behavioural inhibition deficits (Halperin, Sharma, Greenblatt, & 
Schwartz, 1991), thus results from these studies suggest that PG sufferers may be also 
characterized by attentive problems. An alternative explanation for the slow 
performance showed by PGs posits that slowness, as well as omission errors, could be 
the product of a conflict between automatic and voluntary behaviour, due to deficits in 
the organization of stimulus-response schemata (Kertzman et al., 2008). 
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Studies assessing motor inhibition ability in PGs making use of the Stop-Signal 
task provided mixed results. Goudriaan, Oosterlaan, de Beurs and van den Brink (2006) 
compared the performance of PG sufferers, individuals with Tourette syndrome, ADs 
and healthy controls and found that the three clinical groups showed SSRTs 
significantly slower than the control one; no differences between clinical groups 
emerged. The same PG sufferers entered a follow-up study, aimed to investigate 
whether motor inhibition deficits and problems in decision making were related with 
relapse (Goudriaan et al., 2008). Results revealed that only motor inhibition deficits 
were significant predictors of relapses. Also the studies by Reena (2008) and 
Ledgerwood et al. (2012) found inhibitory deficits in PGs who, compared with healthy 
controls, showed a significantly slower performance on a Stop-Signal task and on 
modified version of the Stop-Signal task (GoStop Impulsivity Paradigm; Dougherty, 
2003), respectively. Lawrence, Luty, Bodgan, Sahakian and Clark (2009) made a 
comparison between PGs, ADs and healthy controls and found that ADs performed 
worse than PGs who, in their turn, were more impaired than healthy controls. Lastly, 
Odlaug, Chamberlain, Kim, Schreiber and Grant (2011) explored motor inhibition 
ability through the Stop-Signal task in a community sample; participants were classified 
as PGs, gamblers-at-risk and no-risk gamblers on the basis of scores obtained at the 
Structured Clinical Interview for Pathological Gambling (SCI-PG; Grant, Steinberg, 
Kim, Rounsaville, & Potenza, 2004). Results highlighted that PGs showed longer 
SSRTs than both the other groups.  
On the other hand, several studies failed in detecting poor inhibitory control in PG 
sufferers. Ledgerwood, Alessi, Phoenix and Petry (2009) did not find differences 
between PGs (with and without an history of substance abuse) and healthy controls in 
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performance on the Stop-Signal task; furthermore, those who reported substance use 
problems in the past did not differ from those who did not report it. Lastly, Grant, 
Chamberlain, Schreiber, Odlaug and Kim (2011) did not observe any difference 
between at-risk gamblers and social/non-problem gamblers neither in SSRTs nor in RTs 
for Go Trials.  
   
Decision making ability 
Studies aiming to investigate decision making ability in PGs through the IGT 
generally led to consistent results, highlighting the presence of deficits.  
Cavedini, Riboldi, Keller, D’Annucci and Bellodi (2002b) observed that healthy 
controls overall selected more cards from the advantageous decks than PGs, and that the 
former rapidly learnt to choose cards from those decks. On the contrary, PGs started to 
select cards alternatively from advantageous and disadvantageous decks, shifting to the 
disadvantageous ones towards the end of the task. Goudriaan et al. (2005) compared the 
performance PGs, ADs, patients with Tourette syndrome and healthy controls. They 
found that PGs showed a higher response speed and less response shifting after losses 
than the other three groups; moreover, both PGs and ADs made more disadvantageous 
choices and demonstrated less conceptual knowledge of the advantageous decks than 
the other two groups. Linnet, Røjskjær, Nygaard and Maher (2006), using a modified 
version of the IGT (i.e. the Mouse Game), observed a lower total net-score in PGs than 
in healthy controls. The analysis of the adopted strategies revealed that PGs did not 
perform more disadvantageous sequences than healthy controls; rather, they performed 
less advantageous sequences and showed a lower ratio of good – bad choice sequences 
than controls. Forbush et al. (2008) did not find any difference between PGs and healthy 
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controls in the overall net-score, but they reported that PGs did not shift towards 
advantageous card selection, whereas controls did. An impaired learning was also 
observed by Kertzman et al. (2011) and Ledgerwood et al. (2012). The former found 
significant differences between PGs and healthy controls in blocks 3-5: PGs continued 
to choose more frequently from disadvantageous decks all over the task, thus obtaining 
lower net-scores (Kertzman et al., 2011). Similarly, results from the other study 
revealed that non treatment-seeking PGs had a variable performance, characterized by a 
slower learning than healthy controls (Ledgerwood et al., 2012) 
In the light of the deficits showed by PGs when executing the IGT, several 
authors assessed whether impaired decision making ability, as measured by the IGT, 
was predictive of PG severity (Forbush et al., 2008), relapse (Alvarez-Moya et al., 
2011; Goudriaan et al., 2008) and dropout (Alvarez-Moya et al., 2011). Results suggest 
that performance on the IGT is not a significant predictor neither of PG severity nor of 
relapse (Alvarez-Moya et al., 2011; Forbush et al., 2008; Goudriaan et al., 2008), 
whereas impairment on the task was associated with higher risk of dropout but only at a 
trend level (Alvarez-Moya et al., 2011). Rather, poor response inhibition and 
perseveration for reward (as measured by the Card Playing Task; Newman, Petterson, & 
Kosson, 1987) resulted predictive of relapse in a group of PGs (Goudriaan et al., 2008), 
whereas poor spatial working memory was a predictor of dropout during treatment 
(Alvarez-Moya et al., 2011). 
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3.4.2. Obsessive compulsive disorder  
Motor inhibition ability 
A number of studies have used Go/Nogo paradigms to assess motor inhibition 
ability in OCD individuals; results are inconsistent. Bannon, Gonsalvez, Croft and 
Boyce (2002; 2006) conducted two studies comparing OCD patients and individuals 
suffering from Panic disorder and found that the former performed more commission 
errors than the latter. Furthermore, a subgroup of remitted OCD patients were 
administered the same Go/Nogo task 1.40 (SD = 0.52) years after the end of treatment; 
no difference between the two performances (symptomatic vs remitted phase) emerged, 
thus suggesting the trait-like nature of motor inhibition symptoms in OCD (Bannon et 
al., 2006). Two further studies (Bottesi, Ghisi, Sica, & Sanavio, 2012a; Penadés et al., 
2007) proved that OCD patients performed more commission errors than healthy 
controls in a Go/Nogo task. Recently, Abramovitch, Dar, Schweiger and Hermesh 
(2011a) reported that OCD patients performed slower RTs than healthy controls on a 
different typology of Go/Nogo task, namely the Expanded Go-Nogo test. Furthermore, 
the same Authors compared OCD patients, individuals with attention 
deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) and healthy controls in the same Go/Nogo task 
and found that OCD and ADHD patients performed more commission errors that 
healthy controls, whereas they did not differ each other (Abramovitch, Dar, Hermesh, & 
Schweiger, 2011b). On the other hand, Johannes et al. (2001) and Bohne et al. (2008) 
compared OCD patients with individuals suffering from Tourette syndrome and healthy 
controls on one hand, and patients with Trichotillomania and healthy individuals on the 
other one; no differences between OCD patients and healthy controls in the behavioural 
performance emerged from both studies. Many other studies failed in detecting 
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behavioural differences between OCD patients and healthy controls (Hermann, Jacob, 
Unterecker, & Fallgatter, 2003; Kim, Kim, Yoo, & Kwon, 2007; Maltby, Tolin, 
Worhunsky, O’Keefe, & Kiehl, 2005; Ruchsow et al., 2005; 2007); nonetheless, 
anomalies in the event-related potentials (ERP) components usually related to 
commission errors (ERN/Ne, N200, P300; Hermann et al., 2003; Kim et al., 2007; 
Ruchsow et al., 2005; 2007) and hyperactive anterior cingulated cortex (ACC) during 
task execution (Hermann et al., 2003; Maltby et al., 2005) were observed in OCD 
groups. 
 Studies using the Stop-Signal task generally agreed in finding impaired 
inhibitory control in OCD patients. Penadés et al. (2007) observed slower SSRTs in 
OCD patients than healthy controls; Chamberlain, Fineberg, Blackwell, Robbins and 
Sahakian (2006) reported that OCD individuals’ performance was similar to that of 
patients with Trichotillomania, and both clinical groups were significantly more 
impaired than healthy participants. Chamberlain et al. (2007) reported that unaffected 
first-degree relatives of OCD patients and OCD probands did not differ significantly in 
the performance at the Stop-Signal task; in addition, both groups showed significantly 
longer SSRTs than comparison subjects without a known family history of OCD. 
Boisseau et al. (2012) compared OCD patients, individuals with Eating disorders and 
healthy controls: those with OCD were characterized by slower SSRTs than healthy 
individuals, and showed more omission errors than those suffering from Eating 
disorders.  
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Decision making ability 
Mixed results emerged from studies investigating decision making ability 
through the IGT among OCD patients. Cavedini et al. (2002a) found that OCD patients 
selected a significantly higher number of cards from the disadvantageous decks than 
both healthy controls and patients with Panic disorder; furthermore, OCD individuals 
did not shift in card selection from disadvantageous to advantageous decks. Healthy 
controls and patients with Panic disorder did not differ neither in card selection nor in 
the adopted strategy (they both showed a learning effect over time). Within the OCD 
group, those characterized by a poor treatment response performed worse than those 
positively responding to treatment. A poorer performance in OCD patients (in terms of 
both total and partial net-scores and no shifting in card selection) compared to healthy 
controls was also found by Starcke, Tuschen-Caffier, Markowitsch and Brand (2009). A 
following study performed by the same Authors further highlighted more 
disadvantageous choices in OCD patients that in healthy participants; in particular, the 
OCD group was characterized by lower net-scores in blocks 3 and 5 (Starcke, Tuschen-
Caffier, Markowitsch, & Brand, 2010). Lastly, a group of OCD patients overall 
performed significantly worse (less advantageous choices) than a group of healthy 
subjects (Cavedini, Zorzi, Piccinni, Cavallini, & Bellodi, 2010) and lower net-scores 
(total score and second fifth cards) were observed in a large sample of Brazilian OCD 
patients compared with healthy controls (da Rocha, Alvarenga, Malloy-Diniz, & 
Corrêa, 2011). A further support of decision making impairments characterizing OCD 
came from two studies using the IGT in unaffected first-degrees relatives of OCD 
patients (Cavedini et al., 2010; Viswanath, Janardhan Reddy, Kumar, Kandavel, & 
Chandrashekar, 2009): results highlighted that OCD relatives selected a higher number 
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of cards from disadvantageous decks than both healthy controls’ relatives (Cavedini et 
al., 2010; Viswanath et al., 2009) and healthy probands (Cavedini et al., 2010). 
On the other hand, several authors did not find deficits in the IGT performance 
when assessing OCD patients. Nielen, Veltman, de Jong, Mulder and den Boer (2002) 
reported that individuals with OCD and healthy controls exhibited a similar 
performance, both shifting to the more advantageous decks over time. Also Lawrence et 
al. (2006) failed in detecting overall differences between OCD patients and healthy 
controls during the IGT. Nonetheless, they found that patients with higher hoarding 
symptomatology were characterized by a poorer performance. Lastly, Krishna et al. 
(2011) did not report any impairment in regards to decision making processes when 
comparing medication-naïve and never-treated OCD patients with matched healthy 
controls.  
 
3.4.3. Alcohol dependence 
Motor inhibition ability 
Only a few recent studies assessed motor inhibition ability in ADs, and they all 
reported difficulties in motor inhibition. Goudriaan et al. (2005; 2006) found that ADs 
showed inhibitory deficits in both Go/Nogo task (high number of commission errors) 
and Stop/Signal task (slow SSRTs); Lawrence et al. (2009) reported that ADs were 
characterized by longer SSRTs in a Stop-Signal task, than PGs and healthy controls. 
Bottesi et al. (2011b) reported a positive correlation between the number of commission 
errors on a Go/Nogo task and the self-reported levels of craving in a group of ADs. A 
later study (Bottesi, Imbeck, Gentile, & Ghisi, 2012b), however, showed that a group of 
ADs performed more omission errors and longer RTs than matched healthy controls; no 
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associations between alcohol craving and Go/Nogo task performance emerged.   
Decision making ability 
One of the earliest studies testing decision making ability through the IGT in 
ADs was performed by Mazas, Finn and Steinmetz (2000). They compared four groups 
of participants: ADs with comorbid antisocial personality (ASP), ADs without 
comorbid ASP, individuals diagnosed with ASP and without AD, and a control group 
(no AD neither ASP). Overall, results showed an impaired performance in ADs, in 
terms of more disadvantageous choices; however, the impairment was no longer related 
with AD when including ASP in the analyses. In a further study, Dom, De Wilde, 
Hulstijn, van den Brink and Sabbe (2006) made a comparison between: ADs with 
comorbid Cluster B Personality disorders (PDs), ADs with comorbid Cluster A and 
Cluster C PDs, ADs without comorbid PDs, and healthy controls. All the ADs were 
abstinent. They found that all the clinical groups showed a similar performance over 
blocks that is, they did not learn to shift from disadvantageous to advantageous decks, 
whereas controls improved over time. Furthermore results highlighted that, among the 
ADs, those with comorbid Cluster A or Cluster C PDs performed significantly better 
than the other two groups; the worse performance was observed in the ADs with 
comorbid Cluster B PDs. Another study (Miranda, MacKillop, Meyerson, Justus, & 
Lovallo, 2009) investigating the contribution of ASP in the performance of ADs on the 
IGT revealed that ADs with and without comorbid ASP performed poorly (total net-
score) than healthy controls; however, the two clinical groups showed different patterns, 
as those without ASP were characterized by a delayed, but not absent, shift from 
disadvantageous to advantageous decisions, whereas those with ASP showed 
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difficulties in the maintenance of the learning (Miranda et al., 2009).   
Fein, Klein and Finn (2004) reported that a group of abstinent ADs obtained a 
significantly lower total net-score in comparison with a group of healthy controls; the 
total net-score in the AD group was negatively correlated with the duration of alcohol 
use and with the duration of peak alcohol use. Goudriaan et al. (2005) found that 
abstinent ADs selected a significantly lower number of cards from the advantageous 
decks than healthy controls (ADs had a performance similar to that showed by the PG 
group). However, differently from PGs, ADs learnt to choose cards from low-risk decks 
over time (but selecting them less frequently than healthy controls). Furthermore, both 
ADs and PGs were characterized by less conceptual knowledge of the advantageous 
decks, i.e. they had difficulties in identifying the advantageous decks, when interviewed 
at the end of the task. Consistently with the study by Goudriaan et al. (2005), Nöel, 
Bechara, Dan, Hanak and Verbank (2007) reported that abstinent ADs picked more 
cards from the disadvantageous decks than healthy controls. However, they also 
observed a decline in the ADs performance in the last block of the IGT, thus suggesting 
a return to a disadvantageous strategy at the end of the task and a lack of learning. 
Salgado et al. (2009) reported that abstinent ADs obtained lower total and partial (on 
blocks 2, 4 and 5) net-scores than and healthy controls; however, they only performed t-
tests for independent samples using net-scores as dependent variables, so they did not 
investigate learning effects. More recent studies (Bottesi et al., 2012b; Kim, Sohn, & 
Jeong, 2011; Tomassini et al., 2012) further support the existence of decision-making 
deficits in abstinent ADs, in terms of both a greater number of cards selected from the 
disadvantageous decks and a more impaired performance on the later stages of the IGT 
(in the last two blocks, Kim et al., 2011; in the second and in the last two blocks, 
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Tomassini et al., 2012) than healthy controls. Lastly, a prospective study conducted on 
college students highlighted that disadvantageous decision making on the IGT was a 
predictor of heavy drinking after two years (Goudriaan, Grekin, & Sher, 2011).  
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Chapter 4 
Investigating phenotypic and endophenotypic 
indicators of compulsivity and impulsivity in 
Pathological gamblers 
 
 
4.1. General aims and hypotheses 
 
The present exploratory research was designed to better understand the 
compulsive and impulsive features characterizing PG, thus contributing to the current 
debate about its classification. 
Bottesi (2012) and Grant and Potenza (2006) highlighted that clinical research 
should focus on similarities and differences between PG, OCD and SUDs (exhaustively 
reviewed in Chapter 2) to identify the most appropriate classification of PG in DSM-5: 
nonetheless, to date such a comparison has not been performed. Furthermore, as 
previously stressed in Chapter 3, the integration of phenotypic and endophenotypic 
indicators in clinical practice is crucial as it allows to gather information from different 
channels (Chamberlain et al., 2005; Goudriaan et al., 2008), thus leading to 
multidimensionality in psychological assessment (Sanavio et al., 2008).   
In the present study, PGs were compared with patients with OCD, ADs and 
healthy controls (HCs) on both phenotypic and endophenotypic measures of 
compulsivity and impulsivity. OCD and AD were chosen as clinical control groups 
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since the former represents the prototype of Compulsive disorders, whereas the latter 
shows genetic and neurobiological links with PG. The main aims were to detect 
similarities and differences between clinical groups in self-report and cognitive 
measures of compulsivity and impulsivity, as well as potentially different patterns of 
response in cognitive tasks.  
 
 A second preliminary study was also conducted: a small group of PGs was 
compared with a group of croupiers and HCs on the same measures adopted in the main 
study. Croupiers share with PGs the interest for gambling, and gambling clearly 
represents a relevant daily activity for both groups; they also spend the most of the day 
in the same environment. Furthermore, several studies showed higher risks of 
developing problem or pathological gambling in gaming workers than in general 
population (Hing & Gainsbury, 2011; Hu, Luk, Leong, & Van, 2012; Lee, LaBrie, 
Rhee, & Shaffer, 2008; Shaffer, Vander Bilt, & Hall, 1999b; Wu & Wong, 2008). It is 
not clear whether this is better accounted by environmental or dispositional factors; 
thus, examining compulsivity- and impulsivity-related aspects in such a nonclinical 
population may provide useful information to identify the factors potentially involved in 
the development of PG. Such a dimensional approach has proved to be valuable in 
research on OCD (Burns, Formea, Keortge, & Sternberger, 1995). 
In particular, it is reasonable to assume that croupiers are characterized by lower 
levels of compulsive features than PGs, in that compulsivity is generally associated with 
egodystony (see paragraphs 2.1 and 2.4), but higher than HC, as very often croupiers 
have to perform stereotyped and repetitive actions because of their job. Furthermore, 
higher levels of impulsivity in croupiers than in HCs are expected. Lastly, it will be 
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explored whether motor inhibition and decision making abilities in croupiers are similar 
or different from those characterizing PGs. To the Author’s knowledge, to date 
compulsivity and impulsivity in samples of croupiers have not been investigated. 
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4.2. Study 1 - Compulsivity and impulsivity: a comparison between Pathological 
gamblers, patients with OCD and Alcoholics 
 
4.2.1. Method 
Participants  
 Clinical individuals originally recruited were patients with DSM-IV-TR 
diagnosed PG (PG group; N=44), OCD (OCD group; N=22), and AD (AD group; 
N=75) as their most severe problem. 
They were recruited from the following outpatient and inpatient mental health clinics:  
- PG: Società Italiana di Intervento sulle Patologie Compulsive (SIIPAC), 
Bolzano (N=14); Casa di Cura Parco dei Tigli, Teolo - Padova (N=6); Servizio per le 
Tossicodipendenze, Castrovillari - Cosenza (N=8), Firenze (N=4), Portogruaro - 
Venezia (N=5); Associazione Orthos, Siena (N=7). 
- OCD: Casa di Cura Villa Margherita, Arcugnano - Vicenza (N=10); Casa di 
Cura Parco dei Tigli, Teolo - Padova (N=1); Istituto di Terapia Cognitiva e 
Comportamentale, Padova (N=8); Servizio di Terapia Cognitiva e Comportamentale 
(Liripac), Padova (N=3). 
- AD: Casa di Cura Parco dei Tigli, Teolo - Padova (N=40); Servizio per le 
Tossicodipendenze, Mirano – Venezia (N=35).  
General exclusion criteria were the presence of severe neurological or internistic 
pathologies, current or past psychotic disorder, and mental retardation. Patients with 
secondary comorbid Axis-I or Axis-II diagnoses were included. Specific inclusion 
criteria were: PGs had to score 5 at the South Oaks Gambling Screen (SOGS; Lesieur 
& Blume, 1987; Italian version by Gheradri, Lesieur, & Blume, 1992) and not to report 
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comorbidities with OCD and AD; OCD patients had to score 16 at the Yale–Brown 
Obsessive Compulsive Scale (Y-BOCS; Goodman et al., 1989; Italian version by 
Pancheri, 1992) and not to have comorbid PG or AD; ADs had to score 5 at the 
Alcohol Use Disorders Discrimination Test (AUDIT; Bohn, Babor, & Kranzler, 1995; 
Italian version by Piccinelli et al., 1997), to be detoxified for at least 2 weeks and not to 
report comorbid PG or OCD. After being assessed, suitable patients participating the 
study were 40 PGs, 22 OCD patients, and 40 ADs. Sixty-two out of 102 patients 
(60.8%) were medicated (17 PGs, 12 OCD patients, and 33 ADs). 
Healthy controls (HCs) originally recruited were 75 community individuals 
enrolled in different towns of Northern, Central and Southern Italy. To be included in 
the study, HCs had neither to fulfill diagnostic criteria for any psychiatric disorder nor 
to take any medication. Participants were excluded from the study whether they 
showed: high levels (z>1.64) of depression, as measured by the Beck Depression 
Inventory-II (BDI-II; Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996; Italian version by Ghisi, Flebus, 
Montano, Sanavio, & Sica 2006); high levels (z>1.64) of anxiety, as investigated by the 
Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI; Beck, Epstein, Brown, & Steer, 1988; Italian version by 
Sica, Coradeschi, Ghisi, & Sanavio, 2006) and the Penn State Worry Questionnaire 
(PSWQ; Meyer, Miller, Metzger, & Borkovec, 1990; Italian version by Morani, Pricci, 
& Sanavio, 1999); high levels (z>1.64) of obsessive-compulsive symptoms, as assessed 
by the Padua Inventory (Sanavio, 1988); scores beyond the cut-offs at the SOGS and/or 
at the AUDIT. The final HC group was made up of 47 individuals. 
Groups differed in several demographic variables: gender (all groups were 
mainly composed by males, except for ADs); age (OCD patients were significantly 
younger than participants included in the other 3 groups); marital status and occupation 
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(OCD patients were mainly single and students, respectively). Furthermore, as expected 
the clinical samples scored significantly higher than HCs on BDI-II, BAI, and PSWQ 
(Table 4.1).  
 
Table 4.1. Demographic and clinical variables of the four groups.  
 PG OCD AD HC Ȥ2/F df p post-hoc 
Age  40.01 (12.05) 
31.27  
(11.58)
47.15  
(10.43) 
43.06  
(11.94) 9.18 3,146 <.001 PG=AD=HC<OCD 
Years  
of education 
11.79  
(4.06) 
12.40  
(2.83) 
10.29 
 (3.06) 
10.87  
(3.10) 2.36 3,146 .07 PG=OCD=AD=HC 
Gender  
(% of males) 95 72.7 50 78.7 21.96 3 <.001 - 
Marital Status  
(% of married/cohabitant) 26.9 5.1 25.6 42.3 25.90 9 .002 - 
Occupation  
(% of full-time employed) 27.9 8.8 16.2 47.1 69.15 18 <.001 - 
BDI-II 13.87  (9.72) 
18.40  
(10.43)
15.18  
(9.48) 
2.28  
(2.82) 28.34 3,146 <.001 PG=OCD=AD>HC 
BAI 10.75  (10.49) 
14.05  
(12.21)
13.78 
 (10.67)
3.23  
(2.79) 12.25 3,146 <.001 PG=OCD=AD>HC 
PSWQ 47.33  (12.47) 
58.58  
(13.42)
47.80  
(11.94) 
32.89  
(4.39) 33.59 3,146 <.001 OCD>PG=AD>HC 
Means (standard deviations) for continuous variables are reported.  
Note: post-hoc = Bonferroni post-hoc.  
 
Measures
Self-report screening instruments 
The South Oaks Gambling Screen (SOGS; Lesieur & Blume, 1987; Gheradri et 
al., 1992) is a 20-item self-report measure used to screen for PG. A cut score of 5 or 
more indicates that the individual is a Probable Pathological Gambler (PPG), whereas a 
score of 3-4 indicates that the respondent may have “some problems with gambling”.  
The Alcohol Use Disorders Discrimination Test (AUDIT; Bohn et al., 1995; 
Piccinelli et al., 1997) is a 10-item questionnaire designed to identify people with 
alcohol dependence. A cut-off point of 7/8 has been identified as an optimal value for 
general population screening of at-risk drinking (Reinert & Allen, 2007); Piccinelli et 
al. (1997) suggested that 5 was a better cut-off point for screening in Italian population. 
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The Yale–Brown Obsessive Compulsive Scale (Y-BOCS; Goodman et al., 1989; 
Pancheri, 1992) is an instrument investigating several dimensions characterizing 
obsessions and compulsions (the amount of time consumed, interference with daily 
functioning, distress, resistance, and control associated with OCD symptoms). It 
provides three scores: one for the severity of obsessions, one for the severity of 
compulsions, and a total score (obsessions plus compulsions). A cut-off point of 16 
(total score) indicates clinically significant levels of OCD (Baer, Brown-Beasley, Sorce, 
& Henriques, 1993; Rosenfeld, Dar, Anderson, Kobak, & Greist, 1992).  
The Beck Depression Inventory-II (BDI-II; Beck et al., 1996; Ghisi et al., 2006) 
is a 21-item self-report scale assessing the severity of affective, cognitive, motivational, 
vegetative, and psychomotor components of depression. The BDI-II has excellent 
internal consistency (original version: Į=.93 for students and Į=.92 for clinical 
individuals; Italian version: Į=.80 for students and Į=.87 for depressed patients), and 
test-retest reliability in student samples (original version (1-week): r=.93; Italian version 
(1-month): r=.76). Good Cronbach’s alphas were observed also in the present study 
(PG: Į=.87; OCD: Į=.94; AD: Į=.89; HC: Į=.78). 
The Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI; Beck et al., 1988; Sica et al., 2006) is a 21-
item self-report questionnaire measuring the severity of physiological anxiety 
symptoms. Excellent psychometric properties were observed in both the original 
(internal consistency: Į=.92; 1-week test-retest reliability: r=.75 in a community 
sample) and the Italian version (internal consistency: Į=.89, Į= .87, and Į=.81 in 
undergraduates, community and anxious patients, respectively; 1-month test-retest 
reliability: r=.62 in a student sample). Reliability proved to be good also in groups 
participating the present research (PG: Į=.93; OCD: Į=.94; AD: Į=.89; HC: Į=.73). 
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The Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ; Meyer et al., 1990; Morani et al., 
1999) is a 16-item inventory designed to assess trait worry. Psychometric properties of 
the instrument proved to be good in both undergraduate and clinical samples (Meyer et 
al., 1990); in an Italian community sample Cronbach’s alpha resulted .85 (Morani et al., 
1999). Internal consistency was acceptable also in the present study (PG: Į=.86; OCD: 
Į=.87; AD: Į=.87; HC: Į=.66). 
Self-report measures of compulsivity and impulsivity 
The Padua Inventory (PI; Sanavio, 1988) is a 60-item self-report instrument 
made up of 4 subscales assessing OCD symptoms: Impaired control over mental 
activities (excessive doubting and ruminations), Washing (fears of contamination and 
compulsions aimed to prevent infections and illnesses), Checking compulsions, and 
Impaired control over motor activities (urges and worries associated with overt 
behaviour). The questionnaire demonstrated good psychometric properties: internal 
consistency (Total score) resulted Į=.90 for males and Į=.94 for females, and test-retest 
reliability (1-month) was r=.78 for males and r=.83 for females (Sanavio, 1988).  
The Obsessive Beliefs Questionnaire-87 (OBQ-87; OCCWG, 1997; 2001; Italian 
version by Sica et al., 2004) consists of 87 items which investigate the six dysfunctional 
beliefs supposed to be involved in the onset and maintenance of OCD (OCCWG, 1997). 
Such beliefs seem also to characterize the cognitive style of people suffering from other 
Anxiety and Eating disorders (Frost, Novara, & Rhéaume, 2002; Sica et al., 2004; 
Taylor, Kyrios, Thordarson, Steketee, & Frost, 2002). The Italian version of the 
questionnaire is also made up of 6 subscales (Sica, Coradeschi, Sanavio, Dorz, & Ghisi, 
2003): Perfectionism (the belief that the “perfect solution” for a problem exists and that 
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things must be done in the perfect manner), Overestimation of threat (exaggerating the 
severity of a negative outcome as well as its probability of occurrence), Control of 
thoughts (the belief that having complete control over intrusive thoughts, images, and 
impulses is important, feasible and desirable), Thought-action fusion (TAF; the belief 
that thoughts are important per se and equivalent to actions), Responsibility-Omission 
(feeling responsible not to have prevented a potentially harmful situation) and 
Responsibility-Harm (feeling responsible when performing an action interpreted as 
negative or immoral). The subscales of the original version demonstrated good internal 
consistency (.71<Į<.93) and test-retest reliability (r ranging from .75 to .90; OCCWG, 
1997). As regards the Italian version, internal consistency of the subscales was between 
.85 and .93 for OCD patients and between .74 and .89 for university students; 1-month 
test-retest reliability was evaluated in students and correlation coefficients ranged 
between r=.69 and r=.87 (Sica et al., 2004). 
The Barratt Impulsiveness Scale-11 (BIS-11; Patton et al., 1995; Italian version 
by Fossati, Di Ceglie, Acquarini, & Barratt, 2001) is a 30-item self-report scale 
designed to measure general impulsivity taking into account its multi-factorial nature. In 
particular, the original version investigates three separate components of this construct: 
Motor impulsiveness (i.e. acting “on the spur of the moment”), Attention (i.e. the ability 
to focus attention on one task at hand), and Nonplanning impulsiveness (i.e. not to 
consider the consequences of actions before performing them). The Italian version of 
the BIS-11 is composed by three slightly different subscales: Motor 
impulsiveness/Attention; Perseverance/Lack of delay in obtaining gratification; 
Nonplanning impulsiveness. Psychometric properties of the original version proved to 
be good (Patton et al., 1995). Internal consistency and 2-month test-retest reliability of 
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the BIS-11 Total score were also tested in Italian undergraduate students: they were 
good, Į=.79 and r=.89, respectively (Fossati et al., 2001). 
 
 Cognitive tasks 
 The Go/Nogo task was chosen as it is one of the most well-characterized 
paradigms designed to detect response inhibition deficits (Aron, 2007; Dillon & 
Pizzagalli, 2007; Nigg, 2000), capable of identifying orbitofrontal and ventral prefrontal 
deficits in humans and animals and not involving a memory component (Maltby et al., 
2005). The paradigm adopted in the present study included a practice sequence 
(composed of 20 stimuli, 15 Go and 5 Nogo) to ensure the instructions were understood 
followed by 4 experimental blocks. Each block consisted of 100 stimuli (75 Go and 25 
Nogo), presented in a randomized order on a computer screen placed at a distance of 
120 cm from the subject. The Go stimulus was a green circle and the Nogo stimulus was 
a red circle (both measuring 40 pixels in diameter). The stimulus duration was set at 200 
ms and the stimulus presentation was preceded by a fixation point (white cross) of 500 
ms duration; the response window was of 500 ms and so the interstimulus interval was 
set at 1000 ms (Figure 4.1). Participants were instructed to press the space bar on the 
keyboard with the index finger of their dominant hand as soon as possible whenever the 
Go stimuli appeared on the screen and to refrain from responding to the Nogo stimuli. 
The instructions emphasized both speed and accuracy. Participants were informed that 
they would receive feedback on each error by a sound. Behavioral performance was 
defined as: the number of omission errors (false negative; no response to Go stimuli 
within the response window); the number of commission errors (false positive; failures 
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The study was conducted in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki and 
approved by the institutional board of the Department of General Psychology at the 
University of Padova. 
 
Data screening and statistical analyses 
  Missing data (<1%) in questionnaires were replaced with the participant’s mean 
score on the respective measure.  
All measures were screened for univariate and multivariate normality. The 
identified univariate outliers were winsorized using the method “next highest 
observation plus one” (as recommended by Field, 2009). The distributions on these 
measures were then considered normal according to figures of skew and kurtosis.  
Cronbach’s alphas were also calculated for each subscale of the PI, OBQ-87, 
and BIS-11 in order to test their reliability in each of the four groups. Almost all 
subscales showed acceptable (Į>.60; Theorell, Michélsen, & Nordemar, 1993) to 
excellent (Į>.90) internal consistency in all samples; the only exceptions were the PI 
subscale Impaired control over motor activities and the BIS-11 subscales 
Perseverance/Lack of delay in obtaining gratification and Nonplanning impulsiveness 
(Table 4.2). Removal of item 57 (“I feel I have to make special gestures or walk in a 
certain way”) from the PI subscale Impaired control over motor activities improved the 
reliability of the scale (Į=.60) in both OCD and HC samples, whereas internal 
consistency for the PG and the AD groups did not change;  thus, item 57 was removed 
when computing the subscale score. Differently, analyses did not indicate that removal 
of any item would have significantly improved the internal consistency of the BIS-11 
subscales Perseverance/Lack of delay in obtaining gratification and Nonplanning 
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impulsiveness. Therefore, only the BIS-11 Total score was included in subsequent 
analyses. 
 As regards the Go/Nogo task, RTs lower than 150 ms (accidental responses) 
were excluded. 
 
Table 4.2. Cronbach’s alphas for the PI, OBQ-87 and BIS-11 total and  
subscales scores.  
 PG OCD AD HC N° of items 
PI Total  .96 .95 .93 .90 60 
PI Mental control .93 .93 .92 .68 17 
PI Washing .85 .96 .84 .89 11 
PI Checking  .93 .89 .94 .66 8 
PI Motor control .92 .47 .82 .40 7 
OBQ-87 Total .98 .97 .94 .96 87 
OBQ-87 Perf. .91 .88 .68 .81 14 
OBQ-87 Resp. Harm .90 .88 .74 .84 13 
OBQ-87 Overest. threat .87 .90 .82 .76 11 
OBQ-87 Control thoughts .89 .90 .85 .92 14 
OBQ-87 Resp. Omission .79 .90 .71 .68 6 
OBQ-87 TAF .63 .87 .75 .76 6 
BIS-11 Total .73 .70 .83 .63 30 
BIS-11 Motor/Attention .76 .81 .72 .75 10 
BIS-11 Perseverance/lack of delay .40 .21 .62 .45 12 
BIS-11 Nonplanning .64 .40 .72 .44 8 
Note: Mental control=Impaired control over mental activities; Motor control=Impaired control over     
motor activities; Perf.=Perfectionism; Resp. Harm=Responsibility-Harm; Overest.  
threat=Overestimation of threat; Control thoughts=Control of thoughts; Resp. Omission=Responsibility-
Omission. 
 
 
A two-way Multivariate Analysis of Variance (MANOVA) with group and 
medication (yes/no) as the independent variables was conducted. The dependent 
variables were: the PI and OBQ-87 subscales scores; the BIS-11 Total score; the IGT 
Total net-score; the behavioural data obtained in the Go/Nogo task. Effect sizes (partial 
Ș2) were also calculated. To analyze the between-subjects effects and the 
Group×Medication interaction, pairwise comparisons based on estimated marginal 
means with Bonferroni corrections for multiple comparisons were conducted. All the 
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dependent variables scores were transformed into Z-scores. Mean (SD) raw scores 
obtained by the four groups on all measures, as well as correlations between dependent 
variables (on the total sample), are reported in the Appendix. Moreover, Go/Nogo task 
performances of the 4 samples were further investigated by performing Pearson’s 
correlations between the total number of errors and mean RTs (Go + Nogo trials), and 
the number of commission errors and mean RTs on Nogo trials for each group. Bohne 
et al. (2008) made use of this procedure to identify different profiles of performance on 
the Go/Nogo task in clinical groups. 
Lastly, a 4(group)×5(IGT blocks 1-5) mixed model analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) was performed to analyze the profile of the IGT performances of the 4 
groups. Raw IGT partial net-scores were used. Pairwise comparisons were executed 
based on estimated marginal means with Bonferroni corrections for multiple 
comparisons. SPSS version 17 was used to analyze the data.  
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4.2.2. Results 
 
4.2.2.1. Differences between groups in self-report and cognitive measures 
 Multivariate tests revealed a significant effect of group [Pillai’s trace 
F(48,330)=2.75; p<.001; partial Ș2=.286] and a significant interaction Group×Medication 
[Pillai’s trace F(32,218)=2.07; p=.001; partial Ș2=.233], whereas the effect of medication  
was not significant [Pillai’s trace F(16,108)=1.70; p=.06; partial Ș2=.202]. Tests of 
between-subjects effects (group and medication) are reported in Table 4.3.  
As far as concerns differences between groups, pairwise comparisons revealed 
that:  
- the three clinical groups scored significantly higher than HCs on the PI subscales 
Impaired control over mental activities and Checking (all ps<.01), whereas no 
differences between PG, OCD and AD groups emerged; 
- OCD patients obtained significantly higher scores than the other three groups on the PI 
subscale Washing (all ps<.01); PGs and ADs did not differ, but PGs scored significantly 
higher than HCs (p=.005), whereas ADs obtained scored comparable with those of HCs;  
- PGs scored higher than HCs in the PI subscale Impaired control over motor activities 
(p=.04); 
- the three clinical groups scored significantly higher than HCs on the OBQ-87 
subscales Perfectionism and Overestimation of threat (all ps<.01), whereas no 
differences between PG, OCD and AD groups emerged;   
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Table 4.3. Between-subjects effects tests. Mean (SD) Z-scores obtained by the 4 groups (medicated and 
unmedicated) in all measures. 
Note: Mental control=Impaired control over mental activities; Motor control=Impaired control over motor activities; 
Perf.=Perfectionism; Resp. Harm=Responsibility-Harm; Overest. threat=Overestimation of threat; Control 
thoughts=Control of thoughts; Resp. Omission=Responsibility-Omission. 
 
- PGs and ADs showed significantly higher scores than HCs in the OBQ-87 subscales 
Responsibility-Harm, Control of thoughts and Responsibility-Omission (all ps<.01). No 
differences between PG, OCD and AD groups emerged, and OCD patients scored 
similarly to HCs; 
  Medication status PG OCD AD HC F(3,122) p 
partial 
K2 
Pairwise 
comparisons 
PI
 
Mental  
control 
no 
yes 
total 
.19(1.01) 
.24(1.11) 
.21(1.03) 
-.04(.73) 
1.15(1.26) 
.86(1.25) 
.27(1.01) 
.12(.71) 
.14(.74) 
-.74(.24) 
6.08 .001 .129 PG=OCD=AD>HC 
Washing 
no 
yes 
total 
.26(.93) 
.14(.87) 
.22(.89) 
1.32(1.99) 
1.00(1.74) 
1.08(1.74) 
.12(.97) 
-.12(.61) 
-.09(.66) 
-.54(.47) 
10.04 <.001 .197 OCD>PG>HC 
PG=AD; AD=HC 
Checking 
no 
yes 
total 
.05(1.08) 
.38(1.06) 
.17(1.07) 
-.34(.67) 
.87(1.12) 
.57(1.14) 
.34(1.64) 
.14(1.00) 
.16(1.08) 
-.61(.27) 
2.42 .07 .056 PG=OCD=AD>HC 
Motor 
Control 
no 
yes 
total 
.43(1.82) 
.21(.84) 
.34(1.50) 
-.35(.00) 
.14(.95) 
.02(.84) 
-.26(.21) 
.18(1.20) 
.12(1.12) 
-.32(.15) 1.67 .18 .039 PG>HC 
OCD=AD=HC 
O
B
Q
-8
7 
Perf. 
no 
yes 
total 
.04(.78) 
.27(1.33) 
.13(1.01) 
.54(1.36) 
.30(.81) 
.36(.93) 
.77(.72) 
.03(.95) 
.13(.95) 
-.63(.60) 7.07 <.001 .147 
PG=OCD=AD>HC 
Resp. 
Harm 
no 
yes 
total 
.15(.65) 
.19(1.53) 
.16(1.04) 
-.77(.65) 
.29(1.01) 
.02(1.03) 
.80(.58) 
.24(.82) 
.32(.82) 
-.49(.86) 3.90 .01 .087 PG=AD>HC 
OCD=HC 
Overest.  
threat 
no 
yes 
total 
.14(1.84) 
.36(1.27) 
.22(1.01) 
.00(1.09) 
.76(1.07) 
.57(1.09) 
.91(.68) 
.21(.88) 
.31(.88) 
-.74(.44) 8.27 <.001 .168 
PG=OCD=AD>HC 
Control 
thoughts 
no 
yes 
total 
.16(.82) 
.34(1.28) 
.23(1.00) 
-.98(.72) 
.53(.83) 
.15(1.04) 
.53(.67) 
.22(.85) 
.26(.83) 
-.61(.86) 3.68 .01 .082 PG=AD>HC 
OCD=HC 
Resp.  
Omission 
no 
yes 
total 
-.04(.87) 
.50(1.45) 
.16(1.13) 
-.67(.87) 
.47(1.16) 
.18(1.18) 
1.28(.47) 
.10(.91) 
.26(.95) 
-.55(.46) 5.99 .001 .128 PG=AD>HC 
OCD=HC 
TAF 
no 
yes 
total 
.19(.83) 
.30(1.20) 
.23(.96) 
-.19(1.46) 
-.23(1.15) 
-.22(1.18) 
-.05(.62) 
.13(1.12) 
.11(1.06) 
-.23(.87) 1.32 .27 .031 
PG=OCD=AD=HC 
B
IS
-
11
 
Total score 
no 
yes 
total 
.32(1.05) 
.87(.81) 
.54(.99) 
-.40(1.22) 
.44(1.06) 
.32(1.08) 
-.31(.94) 
.24(1.01) 
.17(1.0) 
-.65(.67) 
6.62 <.001 .139 
PG=OCD>HC 
AD=HC 
IG
T
 
Total 
net score 
no 
yes 
total 
-.39(1.00) 
-.41(.85) 
-.40(.93) 
-.19(.51) 
-.12(.58) 
-.14(.55) 
.12(.65) 
-.22(.49) 
-.18(.52) 
.57(1.33) 
4.34 .006 .096 
PG<HC 
PG=OCD=AD 
OCD=AD=HC 
G
o/
N
og
o 
ta
sk
 
n°  
omission 
no 
yes 
total 
-.33(.44) 
-.10(.55) 
-.24(.49) 
-.62(.13) 
.64(1.50) 
.33(1.41) 
1.08(1.56) 
.29(1.35) 
.40(1.38) 
-.39(.43) 3.75 .01 .084 PG=OCD=HC 
AD>PG=HC 
n°  
commission 
no 
yes 
total 
-.22(.89) 
.01(.82) 
-.13(.86) 
-.54(.39) 
.50(1.52) 
.24(1.40) 
.42(1.49) 
-.05(.89) 
.01(.98) 
-.13(.66) .30 .82 .007 PG=OCD=AD=HC 
RTs  
Go Trials 
no 
yes 
total 
-.14(.99) 
-.04(.96) 
-.10(.96) 
-.43(.70) 
.17(.88) 
.02(.86) 
.91(1.04) 
.31(.93) 
.39(.95) 
-.46(.86) 3.82 .01 .085 PG=OCD=HC 
AD>HC 
RTs  
Nogo 
Trials 
no 
yes 
total 
-.17(.89) 
-.13(1.01) 
-.16(.92) 
-.54(.56) 
.25(1.12) 
.05(1.05) 
1.13(1.24) 
.33(1.04) 
.44(1.09) 
-.27(.88) 3.74 .01 .084 PG=OCD=HC 
AD>PG=HC 
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- PGs and OCD patients scored higher than HCs on the BIS-11 Total score (p<.001 and 
p=.02, respectively). No differences between PG, OCD and AD groups emerged, and 
ADs scored similar to HCs; 
- PGs overall performed worse than HCs at the IGT (p<.001). No differences between 
PG, OCD and AD groups emerged, and OCD patients and ADs performances were 
comparable to that of HCs; 
- on the Go/Nogo task PGs performed similar to OCD patients and HCs; ADs made 
more omission errors and were slower on Nogo trials than both PGs and HCs, and were 
slower on Go trials than HCs (all ps<.01). 
The test of between-subjects effects also highlighted that medicated subjects 
reported higher scores than unmedicated ones on the BIS-11 Total score (p=.04).  
Lastly, the Group×Medication interaction resulted significant in regards to the 
OBQ-87 subscales Control of thoughts (p=.02) and Responsibility-Omission (p<.001), 
and the number of omission errors (p=.01) at the Go/Nogo task. Pairwise comparisons 
showed that unmedicated PGs and unmedicated ADs had higher scores than HCs on the 
OBQ-87 subscale Control of thoughts (p=.01 and p=.04, respectively). Furthermore, 
unmedicated ADs scored higher than the other groups on the OBQ-87 subscale 
Responsibility-Omission, and performed more omission errors on the Go/Nogo task (all 
ps<.05). 
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Table 4.4.. Mean (with respective standard errors) IGT partial net-scores for the 4 groups. 
NET 
SCORES PG OCD AD HC F(3,142) p 
partial 
Ș2 
Bonferroni 
post-hoc 
Block 1 -.65(.8) -.91(1.04) .05(.77) -.77(.71) .28 .84 .006 PG=OCD=AD=HC 
Block 2 -.54(1.02) .82(1.32) .5(.98) 1.53(.9) .79 .50 .016 PG=OCD=AD=HC 
Block 3 1.14(1.19) .64(1.54) -.1(1.14) 5.02(1.05) 4.33 .006 .084 
PG=OCD=AD 
PG=OCD=HC 
AD<HC 
Block 4 .16(1.16) 1.46(1.5) 2.15(1.11) 4.98(1.03) 3.49 .02 .069 
PG=OCD=AD 
OCD=AD=HC 
PG<HC 
Block 5 -.49(1.09) 3.73(1.42) 1.2(1.05) 6.17(.97) 7.97 <.001 .143 
PG=OCD=AD 
OCD=HC 
PG=AD<HC 
Total -.08(.65) 1.16(.84) .76(.62) 3.37(.57) 6.13 .001 .115 
PG=OCD=AD 
OCD=HC 
PG=AD<HC 
 
 
4.2.3. Summary of results   
The main aim of Study 1 was to compare PGs with OCD patients, ADs, and HCs 
on both phenotypic and endophenotypic indicators of compulsivity and impulsivity, in 
order to understand which features are mainly involved in PG.  
In regards to self-report measures, results highlighted that PGs are characterized 
by higher levels of both compulsive and impulsive features than HCs; a number of 
similarities between PGs, OCD patients and ADs in both dimensions were also 
observed.  
As far as concern the Go/Nogo task, PGs performed similar to OCD patients and 
HCs, whereas ADs performed worse than PGs and HCs; in particular, ADs made more 
omission errors (especially those unmedicated) and were slower than both PGs and 
HCs. A further investigation of Go/Nogo task performance (speed by accuracy for 
impulsive errors) failed in detecting any peculiar pattern of response in the clinical 
groups. However, in HC group a negative correlation between number of commission 
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errors and RTs on Nogo trials emerged, thus indicating that nonclinical subjects 
performed on a continuum ranging from a “fast and inaccurate performance” to a “slow 
and accurate performance”.  
The IGT profiles revealed that PGs did not learn to shift from disadvantageous 
to advantageous decks over the task, and showed difficulties in maintaining the 
learning, thus resulting in an overall bad performance. Similarly, performance of ADs 
was poor but, differently from PGs, ADs were characterized by a delayed, and not 
totally absent, shift from disadvantageous to advantageous decisions (net-score 
increases in block 4). A decline on block 5 was observed in both PG and AD groups. No 
differences between OCD patients and HCs emerged.  
Overall, findings from self-report measures support the co-occurrence of 
compulsivity and impulsivity in PGs; consequently, conceptualizing PG as a 
compulsive-impulsive spectrum disorder or a behavioural addiction seems to be equally 
adequate. Furthermore, present results also sustain the existence of a compulsive-
impulsive spectrum, including distinct disorders (i.e., OCD, PG, and AD) characterized 
by different amounts of both dimensions. 
Nonetheless, results from the IGT suggest that cognitive mechanisms of PGs are 
more similar to those characterizing ADs rather than to those typical of OCD, thus 
supporting the hypothesis of impaired decision making ability as endophenotype for 
addictive disorders. 
  
105

4.3. Study 2 - Compulsivity and impulsivity: a comparison between Pathological 
gamblers and croupiers 
 
4.3.1. Method 
Participants  
Twenty croupiers were recruited through the Centro Formazione Croupier, 
Abano Terme (PD). Exclusion criteria were the same applied in Study 1 to participants 
included in the HC group (paragraph 4.2.1). Two subjects were excluded as they 
reported a score of 3 or 4 at the SOGS, and 3 individuals did not enter the study because 
of high levels of depression, anxiety, or worry.  
Forty-five participants were finally included in Study 2: 15 croupiers, 15 PGs 
and 15 HCs. Data from PGs and HCs were randomly selected from those collected in 
Study 1. Groups differed in years of education (croupiers had an higher education level 
than HCs) and marital status (all croupiers were single). PGs reported higher levels of 
depression and worry than the other groups (Table 4.5). 46.7% of PGs were medicated. 
 
Table 4.5. Demographic and clinical variables of the three groups.  
 PG CR HC Ȥ2/F df p post-hoc 
Age  32.33 (8.53) 
28.80 
(7.21)
33.80 
(7.65) 1.62 2,42 .21 PG=CR=HC 
Years  
of education 
12.53 
(3.33) 
14.72 
(2.84)
11.93 
(2.84)
3.37 2,42 .04 PG=CR; PG=HC CR>HC 
Gender  
(% of males) 93.3 100 93.3 1.05 2 .59 - 
Marital Status  
(% of married/cohabitant) 40 0 46.7 9.30 2 .01 - 
Occupation  
(% of full-time employed) 57.1 53.3 73.3 7.21 8 .51 - 
BDI-II 9.67  (7.32) 
3.73 
(3.51)
1.93 
(2.71) 10.04 2,42 <.001 PG>CR=HC 
BAI 9.47  (10.16)
5.57 
(4.34)
3.60 
(2.58) 3.11 2,42 .06 PG=CR=HC 
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 PG CR HC Ȥ2/F df p post-hoc 
PSWQ 44.27 (11.77)
35.13 
(6.97)
30.01 
(4.52) 11.31 2,42 <.001 PG>CR=HC 
Note: post-hoc = Bonferroni post-hoc. CR = croupiers. 
 
Measures and Procedure 
 The same measures and procedure of Study 1 were adopted. 
 
Data screening and statistical analyses 
  Data from croupiers were screened as described in Study 1. Reliability of self-
report measures (PI, OBQ-87, and BIS-11) was tested. In the light of results emerged in 
Study 1, Cronbach’s alphas for the modified PI subscale Impaired control over motor 
activities (without item 57) and the BIS-11 Total score were calculated in the croupiers 
sample and were used in the analyses. Internal consistency for all scales was 
acceptable/good (.70<Į <.90). 
 
 A one-way MANOVA with group as the independent variable was 
conducted. The dependent variables were the same as in Study 1. Effect sizes (partial 
Ș2) and pairwise comparisons based on estimated marginal means with Bonferroni 
corrections for multiple comparisons to explore between-subjects effects were 
conducted. All the dependent variables scores were transformed into Z-scores. Mean 
(SD) raw scores obtained by the 3 groups on all measures are reported in the Appendix. 
Lastly, Go/Nogo task and IGT performances of the 3 samples were analyzed as 
in Study 1. 
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4.3.2. Results 
 
4.3.2.1. Differences between groups in self-report and cognitive measures 
Multivariate tests revealed a significant effect of group [Pillai’s trace 
F(32,50)=1.87; p=.02; partial Ș2=.545]. Tests of the between-groups effects are shown in 
Table 4.6. 
 
Table 4.6. Between-subjects effects tests. Mean (SD) Z-scores obtained by the 3 groups. 
 
 
PG CR HC F(2,39) p partial Ș2 Bonferroni post-hoc 
PI
 
Mental  
control .72(1.43) -.14(.45) -.52(.18) 7.39 .002 .275 PG>CR=HC 
Washing .82(1.14) -.32(.56) -.44(.68) 9.84 <.001 .335 PG>CR=HC 
Checking .55(1.46) -.07(.49) -.44(.41) 4.20 .02 .177 PG>HC=CR CR=PG 
Motor 
Control .87(2.09) .69(.99) -.35(.00) 3.47 .04 .151 
PG>HC=CR 
CR=PG 
O
B
Q
-8
7 
Perf. .33(1.16) .23(.98) -.39(.69) 2.43 .10 .111 PG=CR=HC 
Resp. 
Harm .16(1.32) -.10(.99) -.40(.59) .36 .70 .018 PG=CR=HC 
Overest.  
threat .62(1.19) -.06(.87) -.39(.59) 4.75 .01 .196 
PG>HC=CR 
CR=PG 
Control 
thoughts .31(1.13) -.14(.80) -.21(1.04) 1.16 .32 .056 PG=CR=HC
Resp.  
Omission .39(1.35) .14(.77) -.46(.55) 3.07 .06 .136 PG=CR=HC
TAF .29(1.07) -.46(.77) .01(1.07) 1.90 .16 .089 PG=CR=HC 
BI
S
-1
1 Total score .52(.94) .22(1.21) -.63(.50) 6.51 .004 .250 PG=CR>HC 
IG T
 Total 
net score -.31(.66) .05(1.51) .27(.72) 1.28 .29 .062 PG=CR=HC
G
o/
N
og
o 
ta
sk
 
 
n°  
omission .13(1.14) -.04(.99) -.41(.97) .28 .77 .013 PG=CR=HC
n°  
commission -.20(.84) .12(1.06) -.20(.84) .54 .59 .027 PG=CR=HC
RTs  
Go Trials .20(1.10) -.37(.93) .08(87) 1.55 .25 .074 PG=CR=HC
RTs  
Nogo Trials .10(.96) -.39(.99) .37(.94) 2.08 .14 .096 PG=CR=HC
Note: CR=croupiers. Mental control=Impaired control over mental activities; Motor control=Impaired control over 
motor activities; Perf.=Perfectionism; Resp. Harm=Responsibility-Harm; Overest. threat=Overestimation of threat; 
Control thoughts=Control of thoughts; Resp. Omission=Responsibility-Omission. 
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As far as concerns differences between groups, pairwise comparisons revealed that: 
- PGs had higher scores than both croupiers and HCs in PI subscales Impaired control 
over mental activities and Washing (all ps<.05);  
- PGs scored significantly higher than HCs in PI subscales Checking and Impaired 
control over motor activities, and in OBQ-87 subscale Overestimation of threat (all 
ps<.05), whereas croupiers did not differ neither from PGs nor from HCs; 
- on the BIS-11 Total score, PGs and croupiers scored similarly and significantly higher 
than HCs (all ps<.05); 
- no differences between groups in the cognitive tasks emerged. 
 
4.3.2.2. Analysis of Go/Nogo task performances
 No association between the total number of errors on the Go/Nogo task and 
mean RTs (on both Go and Nogo trials) was observed in any of the 3 groups (all 
ps>.05). As far as concern the impulsive errors, none of the correlations between the 
number of commission errors and mean RTs on Nogo trials was significant (all ps>.05). 
4.3.2.3. Analysis of IGT profiles
The mixed model 3(group)×5(IGT blocks 1-5) ANOVA did not detect 
significant main effects of group [F(2,38)=1.28, p=.29] or block [F(1,38)=1.18, p=.28], nor 
a significant Group×Block interaction [F(2,38)=.96, p=.39]. Mean IGT partial net-scores 
and respective standard errors are reported in Table 4.7.
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4.3.3. Summary of results 
 Study 2 was conducted to preliminary compare compulsive and impulsive 
features in PGs and in croupiers.  
In line with what expected, PGs showed higher levels of self-reported 
compulsivity than both croupiers and HCs, in particular as regards the fear of losing 
control over mental activities. Furthermore, PGs and croupiers reported similar levels of 
impulsivity, significantly higher than those characterizing HCs.  
Statistical analyses did not highlight differences between groups in cognitive 
measures; it is to note that only 45 participants were tested, thus the study was probably 
underpowered. However, a graphical analyses of the IGT learning profiles suggested 
that PGs overall performed worse than both croupiers and HCs. Despite the trend of 
performance of croupiers was similar to that of HCs, the former did not show any 
improvement on block 5, and obtained overall lower scores than HCs, although 
differences did not reach significance level. This result, together with the finding of 
self-reported impulsivity in croupiers, seems to suggest the presence of shared 
impulsive features in PGs and croupiers. 
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Chapter 5 
General discussion 
 
 
A large amount of data on the compulsive and impulsive aspects involved in the 
phenomenology of PG has been gathered during last years. Two main theoretical 
frameworks based on these dimensions have been proposed for PG categorization in 
DSM-5: the compulsive-impulsive spectrum hypothesis (Hollander & Wong, 1995a; 
1995b; McElroy et al., 1994; Oldham et al., 1996) and the behavioural addiction 
conceptualization (Frascella et al., 2010; Holden, 2001; Petry, 2006; Potenza, 2006). 
Both these approaches define compulsivity and impulsivity as crucial features entailing 
PG. However, the former is based on a dimensional perspective, and attempts to verify 
the validity of this hypothesis mainly relied on comparisons between PGs and OCD 
patients on self-report measures. On the other hand, the latter primarily focuses on 
analogies between PG and SUDs, and identifies impulsivity as the predominant feature 
of PG, while compulsivity is hypothesized to occur only in later stages of the disorder 
(“impulsivity-compulsivity shift”; Brewer & Potenza, 2008; Dalley et al., 2011; Everitt 
& Robbins, 2005; Fineberg et al., 2010; Potenza, 2008); comparisons between PGs and 
individuals with SUDs, in particular ADs, have been conducted. Evidence supporting 
one or the other conceptualization are mixed.  
Gottesman and Gould (2003) highlighted the importance of using 
endophenotypic measures in clinical assessment, since such indicators can valuably 
contribute in clarifying diagnosis and classification issues. In relation to PG, 
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behavioural tasks assessing motor inhibition and decision making abilities have been 
used because they evaluate executive functions involved in self-regulating behaviours 
(Aragues et al., 2011; Bechara, 2003; Dalley et al., 2011; Dawe et al., 2004; de Wit & 
Richards, 2004; Potenza & Wit, 2010; Yücel & Lubman, 2007). Impairments in these 
abilities have been observed in PGs, OCD patients and ADs (el-Guebaly et al., 2011; 
Fineberg et al., 2010).   
 The present dissertation was conducted in the light of these considerations, and 
following the recommendation that directly comparing PGs with OCD patients and 
individuals with SUDs can represent a viable way to identify the most suitable 
classification for PG (Bottesi, 2012; Grant & Potenza 2006). 
 In regards to self-report measures, PGs showed more compulsive features than 
healthy individuals. In fact, the former reported significantly higher levels of washing 
and checking symptoms, as well as more fear of losing control over both mental and 
motor activities, than the latter. This result is partially in line with findings by 
Blaszczynski (1999), who observed higher scores on the Impaired control over mental 
activities and the Impaired control over motor activities subscales of the PI, but not on 
subscales measuring washing and checking symptoms, in PGs compared to a group of 
HCs. On the other hand, the present finding is in contrast with results reported by 
Anholt et al. (2004) and Bottesi et al. (2011a), as they did not find any difference 
between PGs and healthy individuals on the Padua-R and the OCI-R, respectively. In 
the present study, PGs also showed higher levels of OC dysfunctional beliefs than HCs, 
with the only exception of TAF. Similar findings have been reported by Anholt et al. 
(2004), who made use of the original version of the OBQ-87. Furthermore, higher 
scores on Perfectionism and Excessive control of thoughts subscales of OBQ-R in PGs 
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than controls have been observed also by Bottesi et al. (2011a). Lastly, PGs were 
characterized by more self-reported impulsive features than HCs. In particular, the BIS-
11 measures three specific dimensions of impulsivity: the tendency to act without 
thinking, lack of attention/impulsive decision making, and poor orientation towards 
future (Patton et al., 1995). The occurrence of these features in the present PG sample is 
in line with findings from a broad meta-analysis, which highlighted that acting on the 
spur of the moment and performing behaviours without thinking represent the main 
impulsive dimensions typical of PG (MacLaren et al., 2011).  
PGs, OCD patients and ADs obtained similar scores (higher than HCs) in several 
self-report measures of both compulsivity and impulsivity. Specifically, all clinical 
groups referred fears of losing control over their mental activities, checking  
compulsions, dysfunctional perfectionism and the tendency to overestimate the severity 
of negative events and their probability of occurrence. These findings are overall 
consistent with studies suggesting similarities in OC symptoms and cognitions between 
OCD patients and PGs on one hand (Anholt et al., 2004; Bottesi et al., 2011a) and OCD 
patients and ADs on the other one (Anton, 2000; Bottesi et al., 2012a; Modell et al., 
1992). Interestingly, PGs and ADs reported scores comparable to OCD patients in the 
OBQ-87 Overestimation of threat subscale. This is in contrast with the result by Anholt 
et al. (2004), who observed lower levels of this dysfunctional domain in PGs than in 
OCD patients and commented the finding as “hardly surprising given the very nature of 
the pathology, and the fact that pathological gambling is correlated with sensation 
seeking behavior” (p. 535). Nonetheless, the tendency of exaggerating the severity and 
probability of threats showed by PGs and ADs participating the present study may be 
related to the ongoing treatment and, therefore, to the recognition of the potentially bad 
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consequences deriving from the performance of their actions. Furthermore, unmedicated 
PGs and ADs reported higher sense of responsibility for their actions and higher need of 
having control over their own thoughts than healthy individuals, whereas OCD patients 
did not differ from HCs in these domains. This result may also be explained in terms of 
the re-interpretation, operated by PGs and ADs, of previously rewarding and 
pleasurable behaviours as potential harms and problems for both themselves and their 
loved ones. Lastly, clinical groups did not differ in regards to self-reported impulsivity 
(but only PGs and OCD patients were more impulsive than HCs). This is consistent 
with the evidence that both PGs and patients with SUDs are generally characterized by 
high scores in self-report measures of impulsivity (Blaszczynski et al., 1997; Potenza et 
al., 2003b; 2009), and with studies which pinpointed that also OCD patients may report 
impulsive features (Ettelt et al., 2007; Potenza, 2007).  
In conclusion, results from self-report questionnaires support the co-occurrence 
of compulsivity and impulsivity in PGs; therefore, both the conceptual frameworks of 
the compulsive-impulsive spectrum and behavioural addiction appear appropriate. This 
is particularly true considering that PGs participating the study were all under treatment; 
thus, the co-occurrence of compulsivity- and impulsivity-related aspects is reasonable 
both in the light of the compulsive-impulsive spectrum hypothesis, which states that 
compulsive and impulsive features may occur simultaneously or at different time points 
within the same individual (Grant & Potenza, 2006), and of the phenomenon of 
“impulsivity-compulsivity shift”, which is typical of addictive behaviours (Brewer & 
Potenza, 2008; Dalley et al., 2011; Everitt & Robbins, 2005; Fineberg et al., 2010; 
Potenza, 2008). Independently of the theoretical conceptualization, present results 
suggest that PGs participating the study were probably in a stage of the disorder 
115

characterized by a shift from egosyntonic novelty driven/impulsive behaviours to 
egodystonic habit driven/compulsive behaviours.  
The number of similarities between PGs, OCD patients and ADs seems to be in 
line with the compulsive-impulsive spectrum hypothesis. According to this dimensional 
approach, OCD is located on the compulsive pole of such a continuum and SUDs lie on 
the impulsive one; PG is postulated to be closer to the impulsive extreme (van den 
Heuvel et al., 2010). Compulsivity and impulsivity are supposed to contribute to 
varying degrees across the disorders, and this would give reason of both similarities and 
differences among these psychopathologies (Grant & Potenza, 2006). Several 
phenomenological analogies between OCD and AD have been reported in literature 
(Anton, 2000; Bottesi, 2012; Lubman et al., 2004; Modell et al., 1992), and the idea of 
including them in a common category of disorders (i.e. the addictive/reward dependent 
spectrum) was taken into account but was also controversial (Lochner & Stein, 2006). 
In the light of the assumptions underlying the compulsive-impulsive spectrum 
hypothesis and of its dimensional nature, present results from self-report questionnaires 
support the inclusion of PG, OCD and AD within the same spectrum of disorders. 
In regards to motor inhibition ability, PGs, OCD patients and healthy individuals 
showed similar performances on the Go/Nogo task. This result is in contrast with 
literature suggesting the presence of motor inhibition deficits in PG (Fuentes et al., 
2006; Goudriaan et al., 2005; Kertzman et al., 2008; Ledgerwood  et al., 2012; Reena, 
2008) and OCD (Abramowitch et al., 2011b; Bannon et al., 2002; 2006; Bottesi et al., 
2012a; Chamberlain et al., 2006; 2007; Penadés et al., 2007). Nonetheless, other authors 
failed in finding impairments in these groups (Bohne et al., 2008; Johannes et al., 2001; 
Hermann et al., 2003; Kim et al., 2007; Lawrence et al., 2009; Ledgerwood et al., 2009; 
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Maltby et al., 2005; Ruchsow et al., 2005; 2007). Moreover, a further investigation of 
Go/Nogo task performances did not highlight any peculiar pattern of response in the 
clinical groups (whereas a negative correlation between number of commission errors 
and the associated mean RTs was observed in HCs). Bohne et al. (2008) suggested that 
the neural processes underlying motor inhibition ability in OCD might be abnormal but 
not altered enough to result in behavioural deficits. Nonetheless, it is unclear whether, 
according to the Authors, this explanation is applicable to OCD per se or only to OCD 
patients under treatment. Furthermore, it would be interesting to ascertain whether this 
argumentation can be applied also to PGs; the neural level of study may be of help in 
that sense. ADs (in particular those unmedicated) overall performed worse than PGs and 
HCs, as they made more omission errors and were slower on both Go and Nogo trials. 
Thus, they did not show motor inhibition deficits, which is in contrast with some 
previous findings (Goudriaan et al., 2005; 2006; Lawrence et al., 2009). Rather, such a 
performance may be indicative of attention deficits (Halperin et al., 1991), and can 
reasonably be attributed to the previous protracted use of alcohol, which may have 
altered the neural circuits involved in task execution. Lastly, the fact that medicated 
patients overall did not perform worse than unmedicated ones is in line with evidence 
suggesting that medication do not affect performance on Go/Nogo task (Bannon et al., 
2002; 2006; Harris & Dinn, 2003; Mataix-Cols, Alonso, Pifarre, Menchon & Vallejo, 
2002; Penadés et al., 2007; Watkins et al., 2005).  
It is important to note that literature on motor inhibition ability makes use of two 
main paradigms: the Go/Nogo task and the Stop-Signal task (Logan et al., 1984). 
Comparing results obtained from the administration of the Go/No go task in the present 
study and research data obtained through the Stop-Signal task may be difficult, as the 
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specific behavioural indexes of motor inhibition deficits are quite different (i.e. number 
of commission errors vs SSRTs; Bottesi, 2012). Furthermore, inconsistent results on 
Go/Nogo task performance can be accounted by the variety of the paradigms adopted in 
literature: Go/Nogo tasks may differ as regards the nature of stimuli (e.g. geometric 
figures, strings of letters); the total number of stimuli and the proportion of Go and 
Nogo stimuli included in each trial; stimuli duration; interstimulus interval duration, 
which can be fixed or variable (Bottesi, 2012). 
Results from the IGT highlighted that PGs and ADs performed worse than HCs, 
whereas OCD patients performance did not differ from that showed by other 
participants. These findings are in line with previous ones, which reported a bad 
performance of PGs (Cavedini et al., 2002b; Goudriaan et al., 2005; Kertzman et al., 
2011; Ledgerwood et al., 2012; Linnet et al., 2006) and ADs (Fein et al., 2004; Kim et 
al., 2011; Miranda et al., 2009; Nöel et al., 2007; Salgado et al., 2009; Tomassini et al., 
2012) when compared to healthy subjects. Furthermore, the absence of deficits in 
decision making ability in OCD patients has been previously observed by several 
authors (Krishna et al., 2012; Lawrence, 2006; Nielen et al., 2002), despite some 
reporting impaired performance in OCD patients, hazardously suggesting an analogy 
between compulsions and immediate rewards (in that they relieve anxiety; Cavedini et 
al., 2002a). 
 The analysis of the IGT profiles revealed that ADs did worse than HCs in block 
3, PGs performed poorer than HCs in block 4, and both PGs and ADs were more 
impaired than HCs in block 5. A typical shift to the disadvantageous decks towards the 
end of the task has been previously observed in PGs (Cavedini et al., 2002b; Forbush et 
al., 2008; Kertzman et al., 2011) and in ADs (Kim et al., 2011; Nöel et al., 2007; 
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Tomassini et al., 2012), thus indicating problems in the maintenance of learning. 
Nonetheless in the present study ADs, differently from PGs, showed a more variable 
performance, as they improved from block 3 to block 4, and then declined in block 5. 
This may suggest that ADs are characterized by a delayed, and not completely absent, 
learning. On the other hand, PGs seemed to be overall impaired, in that they did not 
learn to shift from high-risk decks to low-risk ones all over the task. Partially similar 
findings have been reported by Goudriaan et al. (2005): they observed a comparable 
performance in PGs and ADs, and highlighted that ADs learnt to choose cards from the 
advantageous decks over time, although they selected less frequently from them than 
HCs, whereas PG did not. 
Present results suggest that decision making processes in PGs are more similar 
to those observed in ADs, rather than in OCD patients. From an endophenotype 
perspective, such deficits are likely to be associated with dysfunctions of the brain 
circuitry involved in decision making ability. A diminished activation in the vmPFC and 
in the dopaminergic mesolimbic pathway linking the ventral tegmental area to the 
nucleus accumbens is supposed to be responsible of impulsive choices and reward-
seeking behaviours, and anomalies in these circuits have been observed in both PG and 
SUDs (Bottesi, 2012; Everitt & Robbins, 2005; Potenza, 2006; 2008; Reuter et al., 
2005; Volkow & Fowler, 2000; Williams & Potenza, 2008; Wrase et al., 2007). 
Therefore, present findings from IGT performances claim analogous cognitive 
processes in PG and AD, thus suggesting the adequacy of considering PG a behavioural 
addiction. 
A second preliminary study was conducted to investigate compulsive and 
impulsive symptoms using a dimensional approach, and PGs were compared with a 
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sample of croupiers. Literature documented that croupiers are individuals at risk for the 
development of PG (Hing & Gainsbury, 2011; Hu et al., 2012; Lee et al., 2008; Shaffer 
et al., 1999b; Wu & Wong, 2008); ratios of PG among casino workers vary between 7% 
(Wu & Wong, 2008) and 14% (Hu et al., 2012). Consistently, 10% of croupiers 
recruited in the present study obtained a score indicating “some problems with 
gambling” on the SOGS; therefore, their data were excluded from the analyses. 
 The comparison on self-report measures revealed that PGs are characterized by 
more compulsive features than both croupiers and HCs; this result was rather 
predictable, in the light of the stage of PG characterizing the clinical sample. On the 
other hand, results suggest that the stereotyped actions frequently endorsed by croupiers 
because of their job are not related with compulsivity, as measured by the PI and OBQ-
87. Conversely, PGs and croupiers showed comparable and higher levels of impulsivity 
than HCs; this finding is quite interesting, since impulsivity has been considered a 
probable PG risk factor (Johansson et al., 2009; Vitaro et al., 1997).  
No difference between groups in cognitive measures emerged. Nonetheless, a 
graphical analysis of the IGT profiles highlighted that PGs had a worse performance 
than both croupiers and HCs. The two healthy groups performed quite similar, except 
for block 5: HCs continued to improve also at the end of the task, whereas croupiers did 
not. A typical decline of performance towards the end of the IGT has been observed in 
PG and AD (Cavedini et al., 2002b; Forbush et al., 2008; Kertzman et al., 2011; Kim et 
al., 2011; Nöel et al., 2007; Tomassini et al., 2012) and has been previously discussed. 
Croupiers did not decline, but they did not even increase their net-score, as healthy 
individuals generally do: studies with larger samples sizes may clarify whether 
croupiers’ performance on the IGT is someway impaired or not.  
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 The current study is characterized by some shortcomings. First of all, the small 
samples sizes, which imply low power and make difficult drawing generalizable 
conclusions. Moreover, both PG and OCD groups were heterogeneous: the first in terms 
of type of gambling, the second as regards symptom subtypes; the heterogeneity 
increases the generalizability of any results at a diagnostic level but may also cloud 
individual differences. Furthermore, more than a half of clinical participants were 
medicated: despite the effects of medication resulted rather limited in the present study, 
testing medication-free patients would have guaranteed more accurate findings, 
especially as regards cognitive measures. It is also noteworthy that patients were 
recruited from different Italian outpatient and inpatient mental health clinics: this entails 
heterogeneity within the clinical groups, in terms of both typology and duration of 
treatment. Finally, the inclusion of patients with comorbid Axis-I or Axis-II may have 
affected results.  
The conduction of future studies overcoming the above-mentioned limitations are 
required. The integration of phenotypic and endophenotypic measures in the assessment 
of these disorders appears of great promise, thus it should be perpetrated in clinical 
psychology research; furthermore, studying active and not treatment-seeking gamblers 
would represent a more suitable way to clarify the best diagnostic classification for PG. 
Lastly, investigating compulsive and impulsive features among samples at risk for the 
development of PG, i.e. croupiers, through longitudinal studies is recommended.  
 
To summarize, main findings of the present dissertation suggest that:  
a. on the basis of self-reported compulsivity and impulsivity, categorizing PG as 
a compulsive-impulsive spectrum disorder or as a behavioural addiction is equally 
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adequate. Nonetheless, the compulsive-impulsive spectrum hypotheses seems to be 
more appropriate, in the light of the number of similarities observed between PG, OCD, 
and AD. 
b. IGT performances highlighted that PGs and ADs shared similar decision 
making deficits, whereas OCD patients did not. Thus, from an endophenotype approach 
PGs is better definable as a behavioural addiction; this is in line with the proposal of 
including PG (“Gambling Disorder”) into the “Substance Use and Addictive Disorders” 
category in the DSM-5. 
c. Croupiers, who can be considered individuals at risk of developing PG, 
showed levels of self-reported impulsivity comparable to PGs and a potentially 
impaired performance on the IGT; on the contrary, they did not report any compulsive 
feature. These preliminary results might further support the notion of PG as a 
behavioural addiction, in that probable vulnerability factors for addictions seem to occur 
also in healthy individuals predisposed for PG. Nonetheless, small samples sizes 
advocate that these findings have to be interpreted cautiously. 
 Therefore, results from the present dissertation suggest that both the diagnostic 
classifications may be suitable for PG, but relying on phenotypic or endophenptypic 
indicators imply different conclusions. 
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Informativa ex art.13 D. Lgs. 196/2003 per il trattamento di dati sensibili 
Gentile Signore/a, 
ai sensi del D.Lgs. 196/2003, sulla tutela delle persone e di altri soggetti rispetto al trattamento dei dati personali, il 
trattamento delle informazioni che La riguardano, sarà improntato ai principi di correttezza, liceità e trasparenza e 
tutelando la Sua riservatezza e i Suoi diritti. 
In particolare, i dati idonei a rivelare l'origine razziale ed etnica, le convinzioni religiose, filosofiche o di altro genere, le 
opinioni politiche, l'adesione a partiti, sindacati, associazioni od organizzazioni a carattere religioso, filosofico, politico o 
sindacale, nonché i dati personali idonei a rivelare lo stato di salute e la vita sessuale, possono essere oggetto di 
trattamento solo con il consenso scritto dell'interessato e previa autorizzazione del Garante per la protezione dei dati 
personali (articolo 26).   
Ai sensi dell'articolo 13 del predetto decreto, La informiamo che, nei limiti dell’Autorizzazione generale del Garante 
n.2/2004: 
i dati sensibili da Lei forniti verranno trattati per la finalità della ricerca denominata “caratteristiche psicologiche e 
neuropsicologiche in persone con gioco patologico, disturbo ossessivo compulsivo e dipendenza da alcol” e per 
ricontattarla per via telefonica, fax, posta ordinaria, e-mail, ecc. 
2) il trattamento sarà effettuato con le seguenti modalità: elettroniche e cartacee 
3) I dati non saranno comunicati a nessuno; garantendone l’anonimato e la riservatezza potranno essere utilizzati solo 
a fini didattici, di supervisione clinica o di ricerca scientifica  
4) Il titolare del trattamento è: ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
5) Il responsabile del trattamento è il Dott……………………………………………………………………………………………………………….
6) In ogni momento potrà esercitare i Suoi diritti nei confronti del titolare del trattamento, ai sensi dell'articolo 7 del 
D.lgs.196/2003, che per Sua comodità riproduciamo integralmente: 
Decreto Legislativo n.196/2003, Art. 7 - Diritto di accesso ai dati personali ed altri diritti 
1. L'interessato ha diritto di ottenere la conferma dell'esistenza o meno di dati personali che lo riguardano, anche se non ancora 
registrati, e la loro comunicazione in forma intelligibile. 
2. L'interessato ha diritto di ottenere l'indicazione: 
a) dell'origine dei dati personali; 
b) delle finalità e modalità del trattamento; 
c) della logica applicata in caso di trattamento effettuato con l'ausilio di strumenti elettronici; 
d) degli estremi identificativi del titolare, dei responsabili e del rappresentante designato ai sensi dell'articolo 5, comma 2;
e) dei soggetti o delle categorie di soggetti ai quali i dati personali possono essere comunicati o che possono venirne a conoscenza in 
qualità di rappresentante designato nel territorio dello Stato, di responsabili o incaricati. 
3. L'interessato ha diritto di ottenere: 
a) l'aggiornamento, la rettificazione ovvero, quando vi ha interesse, l'integrazione dei dati; 
b) la cancellazione, la trasformazione in forma anonima o il blocco dei dati trattati in violazione di legge, compresi quelli di cui non è 
necessaria la conservazione in relazione agli scopi per i quali i dati sono stati raccolti o successivamente trattati; 
c) l'attestazione che le operazioni di cui alle lettere a) e b) sono state portate a conoscenza, anche per quanto riguarda il loro 
contenuto, di coloro ai quali i dati sono stati comunicati o diffusi, eccettuato il caso in cui tale adempimento si rivela impossibile o 
comporta un impiego di mezzi manifestamente sproporzionato rispetto al diritto tutelato. 
4. L'interessato ha diritto di opporsi, in tutto o in parte: 
a) per motivi legittimi al trattamento dei dati personali che lo riguardano, ancorché pertinenti allo scopo della raccolta; 
b) al trattamento di dati personali che lo riguardano a fini di invio di materiale pubblicitario o di vendita diretta o per il compimento 
di ricerche di mercato o di comunicazione commerciale. 
Formula di acquisizione del consenso per il trattamento di dati sensibili 
Luogo……………………………., Data………………………………. 
Cognome .................................   Nome ................................... 
Il/La sottoscritto/a, acquisite le informazioni fornite dal titolare del trattamento ai sensi dell'art. 13 del D.lgs. 
n. 196/2003, e consapevole, in particolare, che il trattamento riguarderà i dati "sensibili" di cui all'art.4 comma 1 lett. 
d), nonché art.26 del D.lgs.196/2003, vale a dire i dati "idonei a rivelare l'origine razziale ed etnica, le convinzioni 
religiose, filosofiche o di altro genere, le opinioni politiche, l'adesione a partiti, sindacati, associazioni od organizzazioni
a carattere religioso, filosofico, politico o sindacale, nonché i dati personali idonei a rivelare lo stato di salute e la vita
sessuale";
- presta il suo consenso per il trattamento dei dati necessari allo svolgimento delle operazioni indicate 
nell’informativa. 
Firma leggibile ....................................................................... 
- presta il suo consenso per la comunicazione dei dati ai soggetti indicati nell’informativa. 
Firma leggibile ....................................................................... 
- presta il suo consenso per la diffusione dei dati nell’ambito indicato nell’informativa. 
Firma leggibile ....................................................................... 
- Il/la sottoscritto/a dichiara inoltre: (1) di non essere stato/a in alcun modo forzato/a alla partecipazione, (2) di essere 
stato/a informato/a sulla possibilità di abbandonare in qualsiasi momento la ricerca stessa senza penalizzazione alcuna 
Firma leggibile .......................................................................  
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SCHEDA INFORMATIVA 
Di seguito troverà dei questionari che riguardano alcuni atteggiamenti o comportamenti che le 
persone possono avere. La preghiamo di rispondere alle domande contenute nei questionari, nel 
modo più sincero possibile, tenendo presente che ogni persona è diversa da un’altra per cui non ci 
sono risposte giuste o sbagliate, cerchi semplicemente di ricordare come lei è (o come pensa) la 
maggior parte delle volte. 
                                                                                                    Grazie 
DATA_____________________
ETÁ: ________________________  SESSO:  Maschio  Femmina 
STATO CIVILE: 1____Celibe/Nubile 
2____Sposato/Convivente
3____Separato/Divorziato
4____Vedovo/a
NUMERO DI ANNI DI FREQUENZA SCOLASTICA _____________________ 
(In base al titolo di studio di grado più alto conseguito. Per esempio, diploma superiore = 13 anni; 
scuola media = 8 anni) 
OCCUPAZIONE:   1___Studente     2____Occupato a tempo pieno 
                                3___Part-Time    4____Casalinga 
   5___Disoccupato   6____Pensionato/a 
   7___Non in grado di lavorare per disabilità     
   8___Altro 
FARMACI:   Sì  No 
Se sì, indichi il tipo di farmaco assunto ed il dosaggio ___________________________________ 
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Mean (SD) raw scores obtained by the PG, OCD, AD, and HC groups on self-
report and cognitive measures. 
Note: Mental control=Impaired control over mental activities; Motor control=Impaired control over motor activities; 
Perf.=Perfectionism; Resp. Harm=Responsibility-Harm; Overest.  threat=Overestimation of threat; Control 
thoughts=Control of thoughts; Resp. Omission=Responsibility-Omission. RTs on Go and Nogo trials are reported in 
ms.  
 Medication  PG OCD AD HC
PI
Mental  
control 
no 
yes
total 
15.20(13.26) 
15.85(14.63) 
15.45(13.59) 
12.25(9.64) 
27.92(16.60) 
24.00(16.42) 
16.33(13.35) 
14.26(9.31) 
14.55(9.76) 
3.00(3.14) 
Washing 
no 
yes
total 
11.80(8.95) 
9.85(8.56) 
11.03(8.72) 
22.00(19.17) 
18.92(16.80) 
19.69(16.80) 
10.40(9.32) 
8.13(5.90) 
8.44(6.35) 
4.10(4.54) 
Checking
no 
yes
total 
6.85(7.97) 
8.85(7.65) 
7.64(7.79) 
4.00(4.97) 
12.92(8.26) 
10.69(8.42) 
9.00(12.10) 
7.48(7.42) 
7.69(8.01) 
1.98(1.98) 
Motor 
Control 
no 
yes
total 
1.21(1.68) 
1.20(1.69) 
1.21(1.66) 
.00(.00) 
2.00(2.23) 
1.50(2.11) 
.34(.47) 
.85(1.48) 
.78(1.39) 
.10(.33) 
O
B
Q
-8
7
Perf.
no 
yes
total 
40.85(13.99) 
46.01(22.96) 
42.88(17.90) 
49.75(24.31) 
45.47(14.47) 
46.54(16.59) 
54.00(12.83) 
40.72(17.04) 
42.56(17.01) 
28.98(10.80) 
Resp. Harm 
no 
yes
total 
54.65(9.74) 
57.14(23.01) 
55.63(16.01) 
40.85(9.78) 
56.77(15.17) 
52.79(15.44) 
64.43(8.64) 
56.06(12.27) 
57.22(12.09) 
45.03(12.91) 
Overest.  
threat 
no 
yes
total 
28.68(11.22) 
31.08(16.29) 
29.63(13.25) 
26.82(14.48) 
36.95(14.26) 
34.41(14.54) 
38.93(9.03) 
29.56(11.72) 
30.86(11.74) 
16.93(5.86) 
Control 
thoughts 
no 
yes
total 
49.47(15.15) 
53.69(22.92) 
51.14(18.38) 
28.25(13.38) 
56.23(15.43) 
49.24(19.16) 
56.20(12.48) 
50.56(15.78) 
51.35(15.33) 
35.16(15.95) 
Resp.  
Omission 
no 
yes
total 
14.72(6.87) 
19.77(11.34) 
16.71(9.09) 
9.75(6.85) 
18.70(9.14) 
16.46(9.31) 
25.16(3.72) 
15.77(7.20) 
17.08(7.54) 
10.64(3.65) 
TAF
no 
yes
total 
17.45(6.39) 
18.34(8.88) 
17.80(7.35) 
14.50(11.27) 
14.17(8.92) 
14.25(9.15) 
15.60(4.83) 
16.99(8.67) 
16.79(8.21) 
14.19(6.75) 
B
IS
-
11
 
Total score 
no 
yes
total 
65.62(9.75) 
70.72(7.49) 
67.63(9.16) 
62.25(11.32) 
66.72(9.82) 
65.61(10.02) 
59.78(8,74) 
64.89(9,35) 
64.18(9.32) 
56.58(6.22) 
IG
T Total 
net score 
no 
yes
total 
-.30(18.71) 
-.77(15.89) 
-.48(17.39) 
3.50(9.57) 
4.67(10.79) 
4.38(10.20) 
9.20(12.21) 
2.77(9.19) 
3.67(9.72) 
17.64(24.87) 
G
o/
N
og
o 
ta
sk
 
n°  
omission 
no 
yes
total 
5.40(5.78) 
8.62(6.95) 
6.67(6.36) 
1.50(1.73) 
18.25(19.85) 
14.06(18.59) 
24.00(20.60) 
13.58(17.85) 
15.03(18.31) 
4.64(5.75) 
n°  
commission
no 
yes
total 
9.10(8.48) 
12.00(7.92) 
10.24(8.26) 
6.00(3.74) 
16.00(14.57) 
13.50(13.36) 
15.20(14.29) 
10.71(8.55) 
11.33(9.41) 
9.91(6.26) 
RTs
Go Trials 
no 
yes
total 
334.41(49.63) 
337.93(45.12) 
335.79(47.21) 
318.60(31.61) 
348.61(46.15) 
341.10(44.06) 
389.00(56.88) 
356.32(46.36) 
360.85(48.40) 
318.26(39.43) 
RTs
Nogo Trials 
no 
yes
total 
274.54(41.78) 
276.60(45.02) 
275.35(42.40) 
256.30(22.76) 
295.56(55.48) 
285.75(51.67) 
341.74(66.52) 
299.18(53.89) 
305.09(56.72) 
270.26(46.11) 
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 Pearson’s correlations between self-report and cognitive measures (total sample). 
Note: * = p<.05; ** = p<.01. Mental control=Impaired control over mental activities; Motor control=Impaired control over motor activities; Perf.=Perfectionism; Resp. Harm=Responsibility-Harm; 
Overest. threat=Overestimation of threat; Control thoughts=Control of thoughts; Resp. Omission=Responsibility-Omission. 
  PI OBQ-87 BIS-11 IGT Go/Nogo task 
  Washing Checking Motorcontrol Perf. 
Resp. 
Harm 
Overest. 
threat 
Control
thoughts 
Resp. 
Omission TAF
Total
score 
Total net-
score 
n°
omission
n°
commission
RTs Go 
trials 
RTs Nogo 
trials 
P
I
Mental  
control .572** .700** .417** .656** .466** .809** .578** .525** .344** .401** -.138 .247** .315** .125 .067 
Washing  .571** .213** .453** .313** .496** .299** .329** .167* .138 -.176* .196* .102 .214** .138 
Checking   .373** .512** .459** .644** .511** .491** .269** .224** -.148 .274** .186* .211* .133 
Motor control    .117 .091 .286** .158 .105 .027 .118 .011 -.057 .078 -.069 -.057 
O
B
Q
-
8
7
 
Perf.     .695** .700** .692** .692** .507** .188* -.152 .208* .249** .164* .192* 
Resp. Harm      .611** .784** .705** .607** .060 -.108 .220** .305** .089 .163 
Overest. 
threat       .683** .695** .482** .393** -.222** .239** .256** .146 .118 
Control
thoughts        .651** .663** .198* -.096 .191* .222** .080 .175* 
Resp. 
Omission         .494** .192* -.160 .308** .322** .123 .178* 
TAF          .031 .055 -.012 .008 .073 .061 
B
I
S
-
1
1
Total
score           -.267** .189* .133 .082 .027 
I
G
T Total net 
score            -.099 -.124 -.109 -.074 
G
o
/
N
o
g
o
 
t
a
s
k
 
n°
omission             .305** .408** .370** 
n°
commission              -.264** -.161 
RTs Go trials             .711** 
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Mean (SD) raw scores obtained by PGs, croupiers and HCs on self-report and 
cognitive measures. 

PG CR HC 
PI
Mental  
control 16.47(16.50) 5.93(4.80) 2.27(2.12) 
Washing 13.53(8.61) 4.53(4.03) 4.07(5.12) 
Checking 8.00(8.64) 4.20(3.14) 2.13(2.42) 
Motor 
Control 1.91(2.06) .64(.85) .06(.22) 
O
B
Q
-8
7
Perf. 40.60(16.14) 36.71(14.10) 30.53(9.64) 
Resp. Harm 51.94(16.94) 49.42(12.17) 48.18(8.43) 
Overest.  
threat 28.85(12.90) 19.64(9.22) 17.82(6.34) 
Control 
thoughts 46.07(17.91) 39.47(12.47) 37.73(16.55) 
Resp.  
Omission 16.93(9.32) 14.73(5.34) 11.07(3.77) 
TAF 16.89(7.25) 12.87(5.37) 15.00(7.24) 
B
IS
-
11
 
Total score 66.50(9.80) 62.30(11.74) 54.48(5.22) 
IG
T Total 
net score -0.53(19.77) 10.33(45.09) 16.67(21.54) 
G
o/
N
og
o 
ta
sk
 
n°  
omission 5.67(6.22) 5.07(5.02) 4.20(5.27) 
n°  
commission 7.53(5.94) 11.80(8.50) 7.60(5.95) 
RTs
Go Trials 325.25(44.84) 299.49(35.82) 315.90(33.44) 
RTs
Nogo Trials 274.40(44.79) 249.46(42.24) 286.82(50.55) 
Note: Mental control=Impaired control over mental activities; Motor control=Impaired control  
over motor activities; Perf.=Perfectionism; Resp. Harm=Responsibility-Harm; Overest.  
threat=Overestimation of threat; Control thoughts=Control of thoughts; Resp. 
Omission=Responsibility-Omission. RTs on Go and Nogo trials are reported in ms.  
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